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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH D. MAACK, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, and ROBERT K. JARVIK, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
No. 920298 
Priority 16 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(j) (1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack 
("the Maacks") state that the issues presented on appeal in this 
case follows (the standard for review for each of these issues is 
de novo): 
1. Does Utah recognize a negligence cause of action brought 
by the second owners of a home against the builder of that 
residence? 
2. Have the three elements of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur been established in this case? 
3. Accepting that Utah adopted a products liability as 
applied to the construction of a building, did the District Court 
improperly dismiss the Maacks cause of action for products 
liability against Hoagland and Resource Design based upon defects 
in various component parts of the Maacks! home? 
4. Has or should Utah adopt the implied warranty of 
habitability for residential property? 
5. Is privity of contract necessary to succeed on a claim 
based upon the breach of the implied warranty of habitability on 
residential property? 
6. Were sufficient facts established to support the Maacks1 
negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims? 
7• Did Hoagland and Resource Design establish, as a matter 
of law, that Mr. Maack was negligent by more than fifty percent, 
thus barring the Maacksf claims? 
8. Is a meeting of the minds necessary in order to establish 
Resource Design's implied contract claim? 
9. Do the "as is" clause, seller's warranty clause, and a 
clause stating that there are no oral agreements contained in the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, as a matter of law, eliminate the 
Maacks1 claims against the seller of the residence, Jarvik, for (1) 
breach of contract; (2) for general equitable relief; (3) for 
misrepresentation; (4) for fraudulent concealment; and (5) for 
nondisclosure? 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances 
or regulations whose interpretation is determinative in this case. 
The only rules whose interpretation are relevant in this case are 
U.R.C.P. 12 & 56. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Throughout the course of the proceedings below, it was assumed 
that certain defects existed in the construction of the residence 
the Maacks purchased from Jarvik. Essentially, the District Court 
denied every motion the Maacks filed and granted every motion any 
other party filed. 
Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 9(b) and 12(b), on October 16, 1990, 
defendants/appellees Timothy Hoagland ("Hoagland" ) and Resource 
Design & Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design") filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's [sic] Second and Third Claim for Relief.1 The 
District Court entered an Order on Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, 
Plaintiffs1 Motion to Consolidate and the Schedule of the Case 
dated November 8, 1991, granting the Motion to Dismiss the 
Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief on the basis that the Maacks 
have not and could not plead privity of contract and Utah has not 
XR. 57-59. 
3 
adopted any implied warranties relating to the construction of 
residential property, including the implied warranty of 
habitability.2 
On February 11, 1992, the Maacks filed Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment3 against Resource Design, arguing that the 
record clearly establishes that there was no meeting of the minds, 
and therefore, Resource Design!s claims for relief in its 
Counterclaim based upon an express or implied contract should be 
dismissed. The Court denied this Motion in an Order Denying 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Continuing 
Plaintiffs* Motion to Exclude Defendants1 Expert Witnesses from 
Testifying at Trial dated July 20, 1992.4 
On March 24, 1992, Jarvik filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment,5 alleging that the provisions of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement entitled him to summary judgment on the Maacks1 (1) 
breach of contract claim; (2) claim for general equitable relief; 
(3) misrepresentation claim; (4) fraudulent concealment claim; and 
(5) nondisclosure claim. In an Order entered on May 19, 1992, the 
20rder on Defendants* Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs1 Motion to 
Consolidate, and the Schedule of the Case 1f 2 (R. 548-51) (attached 
as Exhibit f,A" ). 
3R. 1121-24. 
4R. 2286-89 (a copy is attached as Exhibit "B"). 
5R. 1616-32. 
4 
District Court dismissed all of the Maacksf claims against Jarvik.6 
The basis for dismissing these claims is set forth in the Rule 52 
Statement of Grounds and Order for Granting Defendant Robert 
Jarvik?s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs.7 
On March 25, 1992, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56, Resource Design 
and Hoagland filed Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeking 
to have the Maacks' claims based upon (1) strict liability; (2) 
intentional and negligent misrepresentation; and (3) negligence and 
res ipsa loquitur, dismissed upon legal grounds.8 On June 17, 
1992, the District Court entered the Rule 52 Statement of Grounds 
and Order Granting DefendantsT Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Plaintiffs, dismissing the Maacks strict liability claim, 
misrepresentation claims, and negligence and res ipsa loquitur 
claims.9 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. Introduction 
Hoagland and Resource Design were the general contractors for 
the construction of the residence the Maacks purchased from Jarvik. 
6R. 2137-39 (a copy is attached as Exhibit "C"). 
7R. 2140-46 (a copy is attached as Exhibit "D"). 
8The District Court did not rule upon Resource Design's and 
Hoagland?s claim that Hoagland was acting in his representative, as 
opposed to individual, capacity. That issue, therefore, is not 
addressed in this appeal. 
9R. 2212-18 (a copy is attached as Exhibit "E"). 
5 
Their construction practices were negligent and shoddy. They 
applied an inappropriate cement-based stucco to the exterior of the 
residence, when the plans and specifications required the 
installation of a synthetic acrylic stucco. They acknowledge that 
the cement-based stucco is an inappropriate material for the 
climate; they acknowledge that they failed to install necessary 
expansion joints in the cement-based stucco. The roof and decks 
leak. The roof drains and lines were improperly installed, froze, 
and were severed by the contractor at ground level, allowing water 
from the roof to now drain on the ground. The walls of the shower 
in the master bathroom were not properly sealed and leaked. This 
list is by no means comprehensive.10 
2. Hoagland1s Agreement with Jarvik to Construct the 
Residence 
Resource Design is a corporation and is a construction firm 
that engages in general construction, including light commercial 
and residential buildings.11 Hoagland owns one-half of the stock 
of Resource Design.12 Hoagland is a licensed general contractor 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Hoaglandfs and 
Resource Design's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1971); 
Plaintiffs1 Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories (First Set) 
dated October 15, 1990, Answer No. 19 (R. 1898-1903). 
nDeposition Transcript of Timothy Hoagland at 15 ("Hoagland 
Depo. Trans.") (R. 1126). 
12Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 13 (R. 1126). 
6 
in the state of Utah. 
On or about July 1, 1986, Resource Design "aka Tim Hoagland" 
entered into an agreement with Dr. Robert Jarvik to construct a 
house for Jarvik.14 Hoagland was the general contractor of the 
Jarvik house.15 There is a dispute as to whether the "Standard 
Form Agreement between Owner and Contractor" was the entire 
contract between Jarvik and Hoagland.16 Further, the Standard 
Form Agreement Between Owner and Contractor itself suggests that 
the contracting parties are Jarvik, on the one hand, and Resource 
Design and Hoagland, on the other hand.17 Resource Design began 
the construction of the Jarvik house in approximately July of 
1986.18 
3. The Defects in the Stucco 
The specifications on the drawings require the exterior stucco 
finish for the residence to consist of a two-coat synthetic acrylic 
13Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 14 (R. 1126). 
14See Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, 
dated July 1, 1986 (attached as Exhibit "F") (R. 1527-34). 
15See Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor 
(Exhibit "F") (R. 1527-34). 
16
 Jarvik produced during the course of discovery "General 
Conditions of the Contract for Construction." Deposition 
Transcript of Robert Jarvik taken December 11, 1991, Exhibit 3 (R. 
1972). 
17A copy of the Standard Form Agreement Between Owner and 
Contractor is attached as Exhibit "F" (R. 1527-34). 
16Id.; see also Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 96-98 (R. 1127). 
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stucco. General Note No. 5 reads as follows: 
EXTERIOR -- TWO COAT SYNTHETIC ACRYLIC STUCCO 
(FLOAT FINISH) OVER 1" STYROFOAM BOARD SECURED 
W/ MECHANICAL FASTENERS. COLOR AND FINISH BY 
OWNER. "INSULCRETE", "DRIVIT" OR EQUAL 
SYSTEM.19 
In April of 1986, after Hoagland was aware that the plans specified 
synthetic stucco, he had numerous conversations with Jarvik about 
cutting back to a less expensive cement-based stucco.20 In the 
course of switching to a cement-based stucco from the specified 
synthetic acrylic stucco, Hoagland claims he described to Jarvik 
the deficiencies associated with the use of a cement-based stucco, 
including the following facts: it has a potential for cracking, it 
required the use of expansion joints, and it does not behave well 
in cold, freezing climates, such as Salt Lake City.21 Hoagland, 
however, claims Jarvik directed Hoagland not to utilize any 
expansion joints for aesthetic reasons; Jarvik also liked the idea 
that the stucco would crack.22 Jarvik denied these claims. 
If Hoagland is believed, Jarvik did not disclose to the Maacks 
A copy of the General Notes are attached as Exhibit "G" (R. 
1963); Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 38 (lines 6-13) (R. 1949-50). 
20Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 38 (lines 9-22) (R. 1950). 
21Id. at 39 (lines 1-12) (R. 1950); Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Third-Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Statement of Facts IF 6 (R. 1995). 
22Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 40 (lines 1-4 & 16-23) (R. 1950); 
Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition to Third-Party Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts 1[ 6 (R. 1995). 
8 
(1) that a non-specified synthetic acrylic stucco was utilized in 
the construction of the residence, (2) that the cement-based stucco 
utilized in the construction was improper for the climate, (3) that 
contrary to the general contractor's recommendations, Jarvik 
instructed the general contractor to not utilize any expansion 
joints, and (4) that the cement-based stucco would be subject to 
severe cracking.23 
4. The Maacks Purchase of the Residence From Jarvik 
Due to a job change, Jarvik listed the house and never lived 
in it.24 Prior to executing the Earnest Money Sales Agreement,25 
the Maacks were dealing with one of Eagar & Company's real estate 
agents, Maclyn Kesselring.26 Kesselring showed the property which 
forms the subject matter of this litigation to the Maacks and 
drafted the Earnest Money Sales Agreement.27 Prior to the time 
they executed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Kesselring 
"Deposition Transcripts of Robert D. Maack and Robert Jarvik 
(R. 1951). 
24Affidavit of Dr. Robert K. Jarvik 1f 7 (R. 1524); Defendants' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Third-Party Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts 1[ 7 (R. 1996). 
25R. 1540-43 (attached as Exhibit "H"). 
26Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant Robert K. Jarvik 
dated March 31, 1992 1f 2 (R. 1759-62) ("Maack Affidavit"); 
Affidavit of Maclyn Kesselring dated April 10, 1992, 1f1f 4 & 5 (R. 
1841) ("Kesselring Affidavit"). 
27Maack Affidavit at 1f 3 (R. 1760). 
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represented to the Maacks that the property was subject to a 
builder's warranty covering defects and material and 
workmanship.28 Kesselring told the Maacks that the "builder's 
warranty" meant that any defects in the construction would be taken 
care of by the builder.29 
As a result of Kesselring's representation, the Maacks relied 
upon the warranty, and consequently, they did not exercise their 
right to have the property inspected for defects in material and 
workmanship.30 In the event Kesselring did not represent that 
there was a builder's warranty, the Maacks would have had the house 
inspected by a competent general contractor who in all likelihood 
would have discovered all of the defects which are the subject of 
this litigation, especially the defectively selected and applied 
stucco to the exterior of the residence, which at the time the 
Maacks inspected the property appeared to be in good condition.31 
Absent a builder's warranty, if an inspection had occurred and the 
2&Id. at 1[ 4 (R. 1760); Robert Maack Deposition Transcript at 
13-14 (R. 1849-51); Kesselring does not dispute that she told the 
Maacks that the home was under a "builder's warranty" but contends 
this representation was made between the time the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement (R. 1844-47) was entered into and the time of 
closing. Kesselring Affidavit 1f 8 (R. 1841-42); see R. 1874-75. 
29Kesselring Affidavit 1[ 8 (R. 1842). 
30Id. at 1f 6 (R. 1760). 
31Id. at If 7 (R. 1761); Kesselring also acknowledged that the 
disclosure of the "builder's warranty" was in response to the 
Maacks' inquiry about conducting an additional inspection of the 
home. Kesselring Affidavit 1F 8 (R. 1841-42). 
10 
defects which were the subject of the lawsuit were revealed, the 
Maacks either would have not closed on the sale of the Subject 
Property or would have negotiated a sufficient reduction in the 
sales price to cover the repairs of all of the defects.32 
Furthermore, Kesselring represented to the Maacks that the 
stucco in the parapet was defective and would be repaired under 
warranty by the builder. In conjunction with making this 
representation, however, none of the defects in the remaining 
aspect of the stucco, such as the fact that it was a cement-based 
stucco improper for the climate and inappropriately applied, were 
revealed to the Maacks.33 
5. The Maacks Ask Hoagland to Repair Defects in His Work 
In approximately late 1988 and 1989, Mr. Maack contacted 
Hoagland on numerous occasions concerning various defects in the 
house initially manifested through water leakage into the house.34 
Hoagland took remedial measures in an attempt to fix the defective 
conditions of the house. At no time did Hoagland or any employee 
of Resource Design discuss with the Maacks that Resource Design was 
32Maack Affidavit 1f 8 (R. 1761). 
33Admission by Jarvik (R. 1869). 
34Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 126 and 136 (R. 1127); Plaintiffs' 
Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories (First Set), Answer No. 38 
(R. 1922-23). 
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going to charge them for the remedial work.35 At no time did 
Hoagland or any employee of Resource Design discuss price or 
estimates for the subject remedial work,36 Mr. Maack never said 
or did anything that indicated to Hoagland that Mr. Maack expected 
to pay or be charged for Resource Design's remedial work.37 There 
is no written contract between Resource Design and Mr. and Mrs. 
Maack.38 
With one minor exception -- some remodeling work in a 
closet -- the Maacks did not request Resource Design to do any 
additional work.39 They only asked Hoagland to perform certain 
warranty work to repair defects in the material and workmanship in 
their home.40 When the Maacks requested Hoagland to perform work 
that was not of a warranty nature, such as the installation of 
shelving in a closet, a price for that work was negotiated and 
subsequently paid.41 Furthermore, the work that Hoagland 
35Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 127, 128, 136, 138, 139, 140, 143, 
170 & 171 (R. 1127). 
36Id. (R. 1128). 
37Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 171 (R. 1128). 
38Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 170 (R. 1128). 
39Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Opposition to Resource 
Designs and Hoagland's Motion for Summary Judgment 1f 3 (R. 1967A). 
40Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Opposition to Resource 
Designs and Hoaglandfs Motion for Summary Judgment If 3 (R. 1967A). 
41Deposition Transcript of Judith D. Maack dated December 6, 
1991, at 50 (R. 1973). 
12 
performed on the Maacksf residence was in itself defective and did 
not cure any of the problems with the residence.42 If Hoagland 
had not assured the Maacks that the problems would be cured, the 
Maacks would have made other arrangements which would have cured 
the problems and prevented further damage,43 
6. The Defects Result in Damage to the Maacks' Personal 
Property 
Defects in the materials and workmanship in the residence have 
allowed water to penetrate into the personal living spaces of the 
Maacks. This leaking water has destroyed some of the Maacksf 
personal property, such as Mr. Maack?s record collection.44 This 
leaking water also damaged some of the Maacks? personal property, 
such as a cotton sofa.45 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
All of the Maacks claims were dismissed on the basis that 
their legal theories were inadequate. This, of course, was the 
only basis for dismissing them because there was substantial 
4
 Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Opposition to Resource 
Designs and Hoaglandfs Motion for Summary Judgment If 4 (R. 1967A-
68 ) . 
43Plaintif fs ? Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories (First 
Set), Answer No. 42 (R. 1926-27). 
44Deposition Transcript of Robert D. Maack dated January 23, 
1992, at 30-31 (R. 1974). 
45Id.; Deposition Transcript of Judith D. Maack dated December 
6, 1991, at 74-75 (R. 1975). 
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unrefuted evidence that defects existed in the construction of the 
residence due to Hoagland's or Resource Design's shoddy 
construction practices or, depending upon the version of facts 
believed, Jarvik's intentional concealment of those underlying 
defects. 
The second purchaser of a home has a cause of action against 
the builder for negligence. It is foreseeable that a home will be 
constructed by one owner and then sold within the applicable 
statute of limitations. Consequently, it is foreseeable that 
negligent construction practices will damage the second purchaser 
of the home. The limitation on the builder's liability should be 
governed by the applicable statute of limitations, not arbitrary 
limitations placed upon the builder's duty to a second purchaser. 
Further, the doctrine of res Ipsa loquitur contains three elements; 
the facts in this case satisfy all three of them. 
Utah adopted the doctrine of products liability in 
construction. The Utah Supreme Court previously has held that an 
owner may recover for defective components contained in a 
construction project on a theory of products liability. Privity of 
contract is not necessary. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the 
narrow issue of whether the implied warranty of habitability should 
be extended to residential construction, the logic of prior cases 
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in this area dictates that the doctrine should be extended to 
second purchasers of residential property. 
Hoagland performed remedial repair work on the residence in an 
effort to correct his negligent work. Before starting the remedial 
work he suggested that there would be no charge, i.e., he would 
"stand behind" his prior work and "make it right." Later he filed 
a Counterclaim alleging that the work he was performing was in fact 
something for which the Maacks should pay, contrary to his earlier 
representation. The misrepresentation of a present promissory 
intention is a misrepresentation of a presently existing fact, 
entitling the Maacks to recover on the basis of intentional or 
negligent misrepresentation. 
The Maacks were entitled to summary judgment on Resource 
Design's First Claim for Relief in its Counterclaim. The First 
Claim for Relief was based upon the existence of an express or 
implied contract. Without a meeting of the minds, there can be no 
express or implied contract. 
Finally, representations Jarvik1s agents made to the Maacks 
are binding upon Jarvik. The provisions Earnest Money Agreement 
does not relieve Jarvik from tort-based claims, such as fraudulent 
concealment or intentional or negligent misrepresentation. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized, contractual 
provisions cannot provide a defense against fraud claims. 
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ARGUMENT 
The dismissal of claims for failing to state a cause of action 
and the granting of summary judgment in this case are subject to de 
novo review.46 When reviewing an Order granting summary judgment, 
the facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the party 
opposing the Motion and that party is to be given the benefit of 
all inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the evidence. 
The determination of whether the facts reviewed under such a 
standard justify entry of judgment is a question of law, and a 
reviewing court should accord the trial court!s conclusions of law 
no deference, but review then for correctness.47 
In considering the Motions for Summary Judgment, it is not 
appropriate for a court to weigh evidence or assess credibility. 
The sole initial inquiry is whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact.48 Documentary evidence is not dispositive if the 
purpose and intent underlying the documents are at issue.49 
Furthermore, it only takes one sworn statement to dispute the 
466 Moore's Federal Practice 1[ 56.27[1] at 56-852. 
47Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah 
1991). 
48W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 
59 (Utah 1981). 
49Id. 
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averments on the other side of the controversy and create such an 
issue.50 
POINT I. 
IN UTAH, THE MAACKS ARE ENTITLED TO 
MAINTAIN A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IN THE 
ABSENCE OF PROPERTY DAMAGE OR 
PERSONAL INJURY; PROPERTY DAMAGE, 
HOWEVER, DID OCCUR IN THIS CASE 
A Utah Supreme Court decision recognizes the validity of a 
negligence claim of a second owner to recover for defects in 
construction. In Good v. Christensen, 527 P. 2d 223 (Utah 1974), 
Christensen Construction Company built some carports for the 
Hansens in 1965, The Hansens sold the realty to the Goods, the 
plaintiffs in that case, in 1969. In 1973, a heavy snowfall 
occurred, and the carport fell, causing damages to Goods. 
In the Good case, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
[A]n owner does sustain damage as soon as an 
improper construction is made, and he can 
bring an action against the contractor for 
breach of contract or for negligent 
construction. A failure to perform work on 
any construction in a good and workmanlike 
manner affords the owner a cause of action 
immediately. The stranger has no cause of 
action for faulty construction until he 
suffers damage to his own interest. 
Id. at 224 (emphasis added). Consequently, as can be seen from the 
proceeding quote, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes the propriety 
50
 Id. 
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of a second owner's negligence cause of action against the 
contractor for failure to perform construction in a good and 
workmanlike manner. The majority position on this issue in other 
states adopts this position set forth in Good v. Christensen.51 
It is incongruous to argue that Hoagland and Resource Design 
owe no duty to the Maacks. For example, if a structural beam in 
the house failed, struck Mrs. Maack, and severely personally 
injured her, no one would seriously contend that the contractor who 
negligently installed the beam owed no duty to Mrs. Maack. As long 
as she filed her lawsuit in a timely manner within the applicable 
statute of limitations and statute of repose, the contractor's duty 
to Mrs. Maack would be clear: duty would be determined on the 
basis of foreseeable injury, and negligently installing a beam 
certainly could result in foreseeable injury to the occupants of 
the house. The statute of limitations is the only relevant 
limitation on the contractor's duty to the Maacks, not some 
contrived and artificial limitation based upon whether they were 
the first or second purchasers of the home. If it is foreseeable 
that the contractor's negligence could cause damage to the Maacks, 
it is an artificial limitation on its duty to make it subject to 
whether the Maacks are the first purchasers of the home, the second 
51Anno., Liability of builder of residence for latent defects 
therein as runninq to subsequent purchasers from original vendee § 
3, 10 A.L.R.4th 385 (1981). 
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purchasers of the home, or have no financial interest in the home. 
Two decisions from the Supreme Courts of sister states have 
reached the conclusion that a builder of a home is liable for 
damages which are foreseeable and caused by his negligence to the 
second and subsequent purchaser of a home with whom he had no 
contractual relationship even though the work is accepted by the 
first owner before the damage becomes manifest. In other words, a 
subsequent purchaser may state a claim against a builder for latent 
defects in a residence caused by the builder's negligence.52 The 
states that have refused to extend the negligence cause of action 
to subsequent purchasers often turn on case law in each 
jurisdiction which prevents tort recovery for economic loss.53 
Utah precedent is not so limited. 
Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Motion for Summary Judgment 
originally did not contend that they did not owe the Maacks a duty. 
That issue was not raised until their reply memorandum. Rather, 
their original contention was that the Maacks could not recover so-
called "economic damages" by way of a tort claim. There is a Utah 
Supreme Court decision that controls and puts to rest the issue of 
whether a party may recover "economic damages" by way of a tort 
52Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. teller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1045 
(Colo. 1983); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 
(Wyo. 1979). 
53See Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d at 1044. 
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claim. In W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 
(Utah 1981), the District Court granted a summary judgment against 
plaintiffs based upon its finding that the plaintiffs1 claims for 
breach of warranty were barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations and that plaintiffs1 allegations of negligent 
manufacture failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. The District Court's ruling was predicated upon exactly 
the same contention as is presented to the Court in this case: 
that economic losses are not recoverable under a negligence theory. 
In the W.R.H. , Inc. case, between 1970 and 1972, Home, one of 
the plaintiffs in that case, purchased large quantities of plywood 
siding called Mahogason from Economy Builders. After installing 
the siding on construction projects, Home discovered that some of 
the siding was delaminating. On August 14, 1978, Home and W.R.H., 
Inc., commenced their action claiming both breach of warranty and 
negligence in the manufacture and sale of the siding. The 
defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that economic 
losses were not recoverable under a negligence theory. The 
District Court granted the Motion, but the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed, soundly rejecting this argument. 
In reversing the District Court's ruling and allowing the 
recovery of economic damages on the basis of a negligence claim, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
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The basis for the application of classic negligence 
concepts to protect a purchaser from economic losses was 
aptly explained in State ex rel. Western Seed Production 
Corp. v. Campbell, where the Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
"The manufacturer should have a duty of 
exercising due care to avoid foreseeable harm 
to the users of his products. As stated by 
one writer, economic loss from defective 
products is fwithin the range of reasonable 
manufacturer foresight * * * [and this 
foreseeability] should raise at least a duty 
of due care unless some compelling economic or 
social or administrative reason dictates 
otherwise.' . . . Not being aware of any such 
reasons, we hold that [the] complaint states a 
cause of action in tort . . . ." 
The Oregon Court supported their extension of 
negligence law into an area traditionally subject to 
contract concepts by explaining: 
"A buyer's desire to enjoy the benefit of 
his bargain is not an interest which tort law 
has traditionally been called upon to protect. 
It is in this tradition that we have declined, 
in the absence of fault, to impose upon remote 
sellers strict liability to insure customer 
satisfaction. The statutory sales law has set 
out a scheme of warranty liability in which 
the element of fault is irrelevant as long as 
the buyer proceeds against his seller. Fault 
becomes relevant where the loss of the benefit 
of the bargain is traceable to the negligence 
of a remote seller. Recovery for such 
negligence, because it is grounded upon fault, 
falls within traditional tort rules and 
presents no serious conflict with the 
statutory system of non-fault recovery under 
the Uniform Commercial Code." 
The economic damages suffered by W.R.H. Inc. are 
recoverable in conjunction with the property damage 
incurred, and the reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court 
and the allowance of a cause of action for negligent 
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manufacture to recover those damages, is more appropriate 
under the present factual circumstances than the 
application of the strict liability analysis found in 
Clark v. International Harvester. . . • 
Id. at 45-46 (footnotes omitted). 
The W.R.H., Inc. case rejects Resource Design's and Hoagland's 
"economic loss" theory as a limitation on tort claims. The Good 
case specifically endorses the use of the Maacksf theory of 
negligence in this case. There are no other Utah cases suggesting 
otherwise. 
POINT II. 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
APPLIES PERFECTLY TO THE FACTS 
BEFORE THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court in Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion 
Corp., 681 P.2d 1235 (Utah 1984), defined the application and 
effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as follows: 
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary rule 
that permits an inference of negligence on the 
part of a defendant under well-defined 
circumstances. Before being entitled to such 
a jury instruction, a plaintiff must show: 
(1) [T]hat the accident was a kind 
which, in the ordinary course of events, 
would not have happened had due care been 
observed; (2) that the plaintiff's own 
use or operation of the agency or 
instrumentality was not primarily 
responsible for the injury; and (3) that 
the agency or instrumentality causing the 
injury was under the exclusive management 
or control of the defendant. 
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7inderton v. Montgomery, Utah, 607 P. 2d 828, 
833 (1980) (citations omitted). One of the 
purposes of the res ipsa instruction is to 
"cast the burden upon [the person who 
controlled the agency or instrumentality 
causing the injury] to make proof of what 
happened." Id. at 833, quoting Lund v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 280, 
351 P. 2d 952, 954 (1960). It should be noted, 
however, that "[o]nce the elements of res ipsa 
loquitur have been established, it merely 
permits and does not compel the inference of 
negligence by the fact finder." Archibeque v. 
Homrich, 88 N.M. 527, 532, 543 P.2d 820, 825 
(1975). See also, Brizendlne v. Nampa 
Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 
585, 548 P.2d 80, 85 (1976). 
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie 
showing of the elements, he is entitled to a 
res ipsa instruction. The trial court should 
not weigh conflicting evidence of the 
elements; this is the jury's function. In 
order to determine the appropriateness of a 
res ipsa instruction, the court must view the 
evidence "in light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. ..." Rnderton v. Montgomery, 607 
P.2d at 833. 
Id. at 1235. This case perfectly satisfies all three elements of 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.54 
POINT III. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SPECIFICALLY 
RECOGNIZES THE PROPRIETY OF AN 
OWNER'S STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM FOR 
DEFECTS IN CONSTRUCTION 
In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Rrmco Steel Co., 602 P.2d 152 (Utah 
Affidavit of Melvin K. Thompson in Support of Plaintiffs1 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Res Ipsa 
Loquitur (R. 1771-74) ("Thompson Affidavit"). 
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1979), the roof of a shopping mall, which had been operating for 
only approximately three months, partially collapsed. The 
plaintiff's prayer for relief in that case was for the cost of 
restoring the collapsed area, for remedial measures required by 
Murray City in the non-collapsed area of the mall, for lost amounts 
claimed by the tenants while the building was closed, and for the 
lost income from the tenants during that time.55 Id. at 155. Any 
suggestion, therefore, that strict liability does not apply to the 
construction of real property or that economic damages, such as the 
cost of repair, are not recoverable under strict liability must be 
rejected in light of the Ernest W. Hahn case. 
Finally, in the W.R.H., Inc. case, the Utah Supreme Court 
cited with approval Santor v. A&M Karagheuslan, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 
207 A.2d 305 (1965).56 In Santor, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
specifically allowed the recovery of economic losses under strict 
liability theory similar to the factual scenario of this case. 
Anno., .Recovery, under strict liability and tort, for injury 
or damage caused by defects in building or land, 25 A.L.R.4th 351 
(1983), collects all of the cases applying or refusing to apply 
All of these claimed items of damages, which the Utah Supreme 
Court allowed, constitute what Resource Design and Hoagland 
characterize as "economic damages." 
56W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42, 45 
n. 14 (Utah 1981). 
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strict liability to buildings, such as the residence in issue in 
this case. Under section 3, which collects all of the cases which 
support the proposition that recovery would be allowed to 
plaintiffs under a theory of strict liability and tort for injury 
or damage caused by defects in buildings or land, the treatise 
cites the Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. case as one of those cases 
supporting this proposition. Further, that particularly 
proposition is supported by a majority of the cases which have 
addressed the issue. Cf. id. § 3 with § 4. 
In the Second Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint, 
the allegations are that the components of the residence are 
defective, e.g., stucco, adhesives, etc. In the Ernest W. Hahn, 
Inc. case, the Utah Supreme Court adopted strict products liability 
where a component part of the Valley Fair Mall, specifically a 
metal truss joist, was proven to be defective. The allegations in 
the First Amended Complaint are very similar to those contained in 
the Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. case. The allegations contained in the 
Second Claim for Relief of the First Amended Complaint make it 
clear that the strict liability cause of action is directed to both 
the residence in its entirety and to its component parts such as 
the membranes, stucco, and adhesives. Focusing on the stucco as an 
example, Hoagland and Resource Design did not install the specified 
synthetic stucco system. Rather, they installed a three-coat, 
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cement-based stucco, utilizing the products of at least two 
different manufacturers. Hoagland and Resource Design were 
responsible for the selection of these materials and for the 
supervision of their application. Hoagland and Resource Design, 
therefore, are in no different position than was Armco Steel in the 
Ernest W. Hahn case. The Ernest W. Hahn case resolves the issue 
that components of a building constitute products. 
As far as Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's argument that they 
were not a seller is concerned, the Standard Form of Agreement 
Between Owner and Contractor -- Cost of the Work Plus a Fee, 
entered into between Jarvik and Hoagland clearly establishes that 
the defendants were selling the components of the building to 
Jarvik on a cost plus fix fee basis. The allegations forming the 
basis for the strict liability claim in the First Amended Complaint 
comply with the standard developed by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
Ernest W. Hahn, case. 
POINT IV. 
A BUILDER'S IMPLIED WARRANTY OF 
HABITABILITY DOES EXTEND TO THE 
SECOND PURCHASER OF A CUSTOM-BUILT 
RESIDENTIAL HOME 
In its dismissal of the Maacksf claim for breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability, the District Court held, as a 
matter of law, that the implied warranty of habitability does not 
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extend to purchasers of custom built residential homes "because 
plaintiffs have not and could not plead privity of contract and 
Utah has not adopted any implied warranties relating to the 
construction of residential property." 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not squarely addressed 
this narrow issue of law, recent decisions by the Utah Supreme 
Court and decisions from other jurisdictions clearly support the 
Maacks' action for breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability.57 In Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991), the 
Utah Supreme Court rejected the rule of caveat emptor and 
recognized the common law implied warranty of habitability in 
residential leases. Id. In Jobe, the Court held that implied 
warranties are designed to protect ordinary consumers who do not 
have the knowledge, capacity or opportunity to ensure that goods 
they are buying are in safe condition. Id. citing Henningson v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 78 (N.J. 1960). Similarly, 
the implied warranty of habitability was adopted by the courts to 
protect the consumer and to ensure decent housing. 818 P. 2d at 
1010. 
5
 E.g., Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991); P.H. 
Investments v. Oliver, 818 P. 2d 1018 (Utah 1991); Moxley v. Laramie 
Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979); Keyes v. Guy Bailey 
Homes, Inc., 439 So.2d 670 (Miss. 1983); Richards v. Powercraft 
Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427 (Ariz. 1984); see cases cited in footnote 
60, infra. 
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The policies underlying the implied warranty of habitability 
in residential leases applies with equal, if not greater force, to 
the warranty of habitability in the construction of residential 
custom-built homes. The purchase of a home is perhaps the most 
important and expensive investment that a family makes. Most 
purchasers simply do not have the knowledge or expertise necessary 
to discover latent defects; they must reasonably rely on the 
honesty and expertise of the builder. If a home is poorly 
constructed with latent defects, the purchaser may well be 
subjected to a major financial catastrophe against which he has no 
practical means of protecting himself. Under this scenario, the 
courts have extended the warranty of habitability to protect 
innocent purchasers.58 
Moreover, the mere fact that the Maacks were not in privity 
with the builder as the original purchasers does not preclude their 
cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability.59 In Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 
(Wyo. 1979), the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed dismissal of a 
b8Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So.2d 670 (Miss. 1983). 
59Further, the Warranty Deed transferred from Jarvik to the 
Maacks all rights, title and interest in the property, including 
Jarvik*s rights under an implied warranty of habitability. Utah 
Code Ann. § 47-1-12 (1943) (a warranty deed conveys all "rights and 
privileges thereunto belonging."); See Fuller v. Faronlte Theatres 
Co. of Salt Lake, 119 Utah 570, 230 P.2d 335 (1951) (a cause of 
action for breach of warranty is assignable). 
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complaint based on a subsequent purchaserf s cause of action for 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability and held that a 
builder's implied warranty ran not only in favor of the first 
purchaser but to subsequent purchasers. Id. at 736. In pertinent 
part, that Court held as follows: 
The purpose of a warranty is to protect 
innocent purchasers and hold builders 
accountable for their work. With that object 
in mind, any reasoning which would arbitrarily 
interpose a first buyer as an obstruction to 
someone equally as deserving of recovery is 
incomprehensible. Let us assume for example a 
person contracts construction of a home and, a 
month after occupying, is transferred to 
another locality and must sell. Or let us 
look at the family which contracts 
construction, occupies the home and the head 
of the household dies a year later and the 
residence must, for economic reasons, be sold. 
Further, how about the one who contracts for 
construction of a home, occupies it and, after 
a couple of years, attracted by a profit 
incentive caused by inflation or otherwise, 
sells to another. No reason has been 
presented to us whereby the original owner 
should have the benefits of an implied 
warranty or a recovery on a negligence theory 
and the next owner should not simply because 
there has been a transfer. Such intervening 
sales, standing by themselves, should not, by 
any standard of reasonableness, effect an end 
to an implied warranty or, in that matter, a 
right of recovery on any other ground, upon 
manifestation of a defect. The builder always 
has available the defense that the defects are 
not attributable to him. 
Id. (emphasis added). The first hypothetical is identical to the 
facts in this case: Jarvik took a job in New York. 
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Most courts that have recently considered the issue have 
rejected a privity requirement and held that a home builder's 
warranty of habitability extends to subsequent purchasers for a 
reasonable length of time.60 The reasonable length of time should 
be determined by the applicable statute of limitations and statute 
of repose. 
In short, there is no principled basis for the District 
Court's refusal to extend the warranty of habitability to 
residential, custom-built homes. Similarly, the concept of privity 
as a bar to recovery by subsequent purchasers on a cause of action 
for implied warranty of habitability will frustrate the policies 
underlying the concept of the implied warranty of habitability. 
The better view is to reject the antiquated concept of privity and 
adopt the rule that subsequent purchasers may pursue a cause of 
action for breach implied warranty of habitability for latent 
defects discovered within a reasonable length of time after the 
date of purchase. 
bE.g., Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., supra; Richards v. 
Powercrart Homes, Inc., supra; Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co. , Inc., 264 
Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619^ (1976); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 
N.E.2d 324 [ill. 1982); Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super 424, 437 
A. 2d 925 (1981); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 
1983). Blagg v. Fred Hunt Company, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 
1981); Terlinde v. Neelu, 271 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 1980); Elden v. 
SimmonsL 631 P. 2d 739 (Okl. 1981); Lempke v. Dagenais, 547 A. 2d 298 (N.H. 1988); Sewell v. Gregory, 371 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1988). See 
Anno., 10 A.L.R.4th 385 (1981). 
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POINT V, 
HOAGLAND MADE REPRESENTATIONS 
DIRECTLY TO THE MAACKS PRIOR TO AND 
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WARRANTY 
WORK HE PERFORMED ON THE RESIDENCE 
Hoagland made several representations to the Maacks prior to 
and in conjunction with performing repair or warranty work on the 
residence. These include representations that he would "stand 
behind" his prior work and "make it right." In conjunction with 
the remedial work, the issue is not whether Hoagland broke a 
promise. Rather, Hoagland stated that he was doing the work as 
remedial work and suggested that it would be at no charge, i.e., he 
would "stand behind" his prior work and "make it right." Later, he 
filed a Counterclaim alleging that the work he was performing was 
in fact something the Maacks should pay for, contrary to his 
earlier representation. In Galloway v. AFCO Development Corp., 777 
P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989), the Court stated that "[t]o be liable 
for fraud, a defendant's misrepresentation must be of a presently 
existing fact. However, it is settled that a misrepresentation of 
a present promissory intention is a misrepresentation of a 
presently existing fact. . . . " Id. at 508 (footnote omitted). 
Hoaglandfs representation that he would "stand behind" his work and 
"make it right" were misrepresentations of presently existing 
facts. Despite his assurance that he would fix the defects in the 
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house without any cost to the Maacks, Hoagland nevertheless filed 
a Counterclaim in this case. Not only does this constitute a 
misrepresentation of a presently existing fact, but it also would 
form the basis for a claim that Hoagland never intended to perform 
as he suggested. Either way, the fraud claim against Hoagland was 
properly pled. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Christensen v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983), defined the tort of 
negligent misrepresentation as follows: 
Negligent misrepresentation is a tort 
which grew out of common-law fraud. We 
defined it in Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 
Utah 2d 378, 381, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967), as 
follows: 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest 
in a transaction, (2) is in a superior 
position to know material facts, and (3) 
carelessly or negligently makes a false 
representation concerning them, (4) 
expecting the other party to rely and act 
thereon, and (5) the other party 
reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss 
in that transaction, the representor can 
be held responsible if the other elements 
of fraud are also present. [Subdivisions 
added.] 
See also, Bugan v. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 1239 
(1980); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 
(1965). See generally, 1 F. Harper and F. 
James, The Law of Torts, § 7.6 (1956); W. 
Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 107 at 704-710 
(4th ed. 1971). 
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As the definition suggests, a casual 
statement or gratuitous advice from a stranger 
to a transaction cannot be the grounds for 
negligent misrepresentation. The recipient of 
such information could not reasonably rely on 
it because he could hardly expect the 
representor to exercise prudence and care in 
making the statement that would warrant 
reliance. If, however, the information is 
given in the capacity of one in the business 
of supplying such information, that care and 
diligence should be exercised which is 
compatible with the particular business or 
profession involved. Those who deal with such 
persons do so because of the advantages which 
they expect to derive from this special 
competence. The law, therefore, may well 
predicate on such a relationship, the duty of 
care to insure the accuracy and validity of 
the information. 
1 F. Harper & F. James, supra, § 7.6 at 546 
(footnotes omitted). 
Id. at 305. Subsequent case law demonstrates that it is not 
necessary to independently establish fraud. Prlce-Orem Investment 
Co. v. Rollins Brown & Gunnel 1, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 n.2 (Utah 
1986).61 
The allegations as pled are not allegations of a breach of 
promise: the allegations demonstrate a misrepresentation of a 
material fact, i.e., that Hoagland was doing the work without cost 
to the Maacks. The Maacks were damaged by their delay in hiring a 
competent contractor to repair the defective work, by accommodating 
See Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). 
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Hoagland's schedule and allowing him to do the remedial work 
scheduled around other projects, something they would not have to 
tolerate if they were paying for the repair work, and by having to 
defend against a frivolous Counterclaim. 
POINT VI. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE 
COURT COULD BASE A CONCLUSION THAT 
MR. MAACK WAS NEGLIGENT 
Summary judgment is generally improper on the issue of 
negligence, and only in clear-cut cases, with the exercise of great 
caution, should a court grant summary judgment on the issue of 
negligence.62 In its Rule 52 Statement of Grounds and Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Plaintiffs, in the second paragraph 5,63 the Court concludes that 
the " [p] laintif f s ' failure to ask for a copy or written evidence of 
a fbuilder's warranty,' their failure to condition the offer to 
purchase the Home on the existence of a 'builder's warranty' or on 
the receipt of an acceptable inspection report, especially in light 
of Robert Maackfs professional training, clearly shows, and a 
reasonable jury cannot find otherwise, that plaintiffs did not 
exercise ordinary, reasonable diligence." This conclusion is 
simply contrary to the facts in the case, 
62Kltchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah App. 1991). 
63R. 2216-17. 
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Prior to the execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
Maclyn Kesselring (Jarvik?s agent) indicated that a builder's 
warranty existed that would take care of any defects in 
construction. Trusting Kesselring certainly could not be construed 
as negligence. It was this representation that dissuaded the 
Maacks from obtaining a further inspection of the property by a 
general contractor. The fact that Mr. Maack is an attorney, 
likewise, does not mean that the Maacks' trust and confidence 
placed in Kesselring was negligent. Failing to insist that the 
warranty be inserted in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement under 
"Seller's Warranties" is inconclusive. The warranty was from the 
builder, Hoagland, not from the seller, Jarvik. 
In addition, contributory negligence in the state of Utah is 
only a bar in the event that that negligence equals or exceeds 
fifty percent.64 To conclude as a matter of law that trusting 
Kesselring constituted negligence in excess of fifty percent seems 
to be a difficult conclusion to reach at best. Finally, Mrs. Maack 
also was a purchaser of the home and had no legal training. The 
implication from the Court's conclusion was that she was negligent 
in relying upon her husband, who was merely trusting Kesselring's 
representations as being accurate. The District Court's conclusion 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1986). 
35 
essentially is that anyone who trusts an oral representation and 
does not obtain documentation of it is negligent per se in the 
event that the representation turns out to be false. 
POINT VII. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
MAACKS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERED ON 
RESOURCE DESIGN'S FIRST CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF IN ITS COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE 
IT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ESSENTIAL 
ELEMENT OF AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
CONTRACT: A MEETING OF THE MINDS 
Resource Design's First Claim for Relief (Breach of Contract) 
in its Counterclaim obviously presumes the existence of an express 
contract. Resource Design concedes that there is no written 
contract between the Maack and itself.65 Undisputed material 
facts established that there was no oral contract between Resource 
Design and the Maacks. 
An oral contract exists only where there is a meeting of the 
minds of the parties.66 Here, Resource Design has the burden of 
proof to show the existence of a contract between Resource Design 
and the Maacks.67 
6bSee Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 170 (R. 1128). 
66B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 
1972) (it is an elemental principle that the creation of a contract 
requires a meeting of the minds;. 
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 Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) (burden 
of proving existence of contract is on the party seeking to enforce 
it); Nuhn v. Broadbent, 507 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1973) (plaintiff 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence a meeting of the 
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Resource Design asserts the existence of a contract between 
the Maacks and itself wherein Resource Design agreed to do certain 
"construction work" in return for payment and Mr. and Mrs. Maack 
requested Resource Design to do certain "construction work" and Mr. 
and Mrs. Maack agreed to pay Resource Design for said work.69 
Hoagland's testimony establishes that there was no oral 
contract between Resource Design and Mr. and Mrs. Maack. Hoagland 
testified that neither he nor any other agent or employee of 
Resource Design orally agreed with the Maacks to perform the 
remedial work for $16,985.00 or for payment.70 Hoaglandfs 
testified there was no discussion with the Maacks, at any time, 
that the Maacks were to be charged for the remedial work that is 
the subject of Resource Design's counterclaim: 
Q: Tim, would you tell us, please, was there 
ever a discussion between you, me [Robert 
Maack], or Judy [Maack], or any of your 
employees about being paid for the work that 
you were doing at the house? 
minds). 
68Counterclaim at irif 4 and 6 (R. 16). 
69Resource Design's breach of contract claim tellingly omits 
any allegation that the parties agreed upon the amount, or form, or 
calculation of compensation for the alleged "construction work." 
See Counterclaim at irif 4-7 (R. 16). 
70Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 143 (R. 1130). 
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A: There were no discussions about that, 
no.71 
In fact, Hoagland stated that he worked on the house without charge 
to the Maacks initially.72 His unexpressed hope was if the repair 
work became too extensive other parties would pay for or share in 
the cost: 
Q: Do you recall, in any or your contacts 
with Mr. Maack, any discussion between the two 
of you about a bid, a cost estimate or the 
fact that he was going to pay for any of the 
work associated with this remedial work? 
A: The initial work that I did, I did 
basically as a courtesy in response to a 
fairly impending problem. I mean, he [Maack] 
was having some leaks in his house. The issue 
of cost of repair was never brought up. It 
was my expectation that if things went too 
far, that I would get compensation or share 
the burden of cost for repair with other 
parties.73 
Hoagland1s own testimony conclusively establishes the absence of a 
meeting of the minds between the parties. Moreover, Hoagland?s 
unexpressed "hope" that at some indeterminate time he would begin 
to charge various parties in order to continue to perform his 
remedial work does not unilaterally form an express or oral 
contract between the Maacks and Resource Design. As the Utah 
71Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 143; see Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 
127, 128, 136, 138, 139, 140, 150, 170 & 171 (R. 1127). 
72Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 140 (R. 1131). 
73Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 140-41 (R. 1131). 
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Supreme Court stated: 
It is a basic principal of contract law there 
can be no contract without a meeting of the 
minds of the parties which must be spelled out 
either expressly or impliedly with sufficient 
definiteness to allow enforcement.74 
Furthermore, the intentions of the parties are controlling in 
determining the terms and existence of a contract.75 Clearly, 
Hoaglandfs own unexpressed intentions, even if divined by other 
parties, would not support the existence of the contract that 
Resource Design alleged in its Counterclaim. 
POINT VIII. 
RESOURCE DESIGN'S COUNTERCLAIM FAILS 
TO ASSERT A CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR 
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT 
Resource Design admits that there was no express contract 
between Resource Design and the Maacks.76 Having conceded the 
lack of a written or oral contract, Resource Design then claimed 
that its breach of contract claim is really a claim for breach of 
implied contract. Resource Design's First Claim for Relief, 
however, does not set forth a claim for breach of an implied 
740i>erhansly, 572 P. 2d at 1386. 
75Id. 
76Defendantfs Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment at 4 (R. 1312). 
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contract.77 Clearly, Resource Design's First Claim for Relief is 
for breach of contract (express) and does not plead the elements of 
an implied contract. While inventive, Resource Design cannot amend 
its counterclaim by way of a memorandum in opposition to partial 
summary judgment. Notwithstanding Resource Design's attempt to 
recharacterize its claim or inaugurate a claim for relief for 
breach of an implied contract, such claim fails as a matter of law. 
Resource Design erroneously argued that an express meeting of 
the minds is irrelevant to determining the existence of an implied 
contract.78 Repeating the well-established rule of law, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P. 2d 
695, 696 (Utah 1976), that a meeting of the minds of the parties is 
essential to a finding that an implied contract existed.79 Here, 
Resource Design failed to aver facts to establish a meeting of the 
minds and even implicitly concedes that there was no meeting of the 
minds of the parties. Therefore, there exists no disputed material 
fact that precludes the Court from granting the Maacks' motion for 
partial summary judgment. 
77Counterclaim 1Mf 3-7 (R. 17). 
78Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment at 5 (R. 1313). 
79See Lirtzman v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 677 F.2d 548, 551 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (an implied-in-fact contract requires, like an express 
contract, that the parties' minds must meet through offer and 
acceptance, and the contract must be definite in its terms). 
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Finally, in an effort to create a material fact in dispute, 
Resource Design interjects the affidavit of Mr, Timothy Hoagland in 
which he states belatedly that Resource Design performed its 
remedial work with the intent that the Maacks were to compensate 
it. Hoagland?s statement of intent is contradicted by his earlier 
deposition testimony.80 Hoagland cannot submit an affidavit that 
contradicts his sworn deposition testimony.81 Subsequent 
decisions in the State of Utah have followed this rule and have 
refused, under similar circumstances to this case, to allow a 
factual issue to be created on a motion for summary judgment by 
statements in an affidavit which contradict deposition 
testimony.82 
Further, Hoaglandfs self-serving declaration was inadmissible 
for determining intent for purposes of the instant motion.83 In 
fact, Hoagland testified that the Maacks did not ever do anything 
that led him to believe that they intended to pay Resource Design 
80Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 127, 128, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 
143, 170 and 171 (R. 1127). 
81Wei>ster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). 
B2Guardlan State Bank v. Humpherus, 762 P. 2d 1084t 1087 (Utah 
1988); Gaw v. UDOT, 798 P.2d 1130, 1136 (Utah App. 1990); Floyd v. 
Western Surgical Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah App. 
1989). 
83Brown v. General Ins. Co. of America, 70 N.M. 46, 369 P.2d 
968, 971 (1962) ("Self-serving declarations regardless of relevancy 
or materiality are incompetent."); King v. United States, 641 F.2d 
253, 263 (5th Cir. 1981) (court is not bound to accept self-serving 
statements as to intent). 
41 
or expected to be charged for Resource Design's remedial work. 
Further, the undisputed testimony shows that the Maacks did not 
know that Resource Design expected to be paid for the remedial work 
it performed. 
POINT IX. 
THROUGH HIS AGENT, ROBERT K. JARVIK 
NEGLIGENTLY AND FALSELY REPRESENTED 
TO THE MAACKS THAT A BUILDER'S 
WARRANTY EXISTED UPON WHICH THE 
MAACKS REASONABLY RELIED TO THEIR 
DETRIMENT 
There can be no dispute that the real estate agent in this 
case, Eager & Company, and its agent, Kesselring, are agents of the 
seller, Jarvik.85 Kesselring made certain representations to the 
Maacks prior to the time they purchased the residence, including 
but not limited to the fact that a builder's warranty existed on 
the property. Hoagland and Resource Design contend that this 
representation was false, and the Maacks have no ability to prove 
otherwise. The Maacks reasonably relied upon this representation. 
The fact that a builder's warranty does not exist has caused them 
considerable damage. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chrlstensen v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983), defined the tort of 
84Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 171 (R. 1128). 
85Earnest Money Sales Agreement between Maack and Jarvik dated 
July 27, 1988 1f 10; Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P. 2d 461 (Utah 1984). 
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negligent misrepresentation. The language in which it did so is 
quoted on pages 32-33, supra. Subsequent case law demonstrates 
that it is not necessary to independently establish fraud.86 
In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), the third-party 
plaintiffs were real estate purchasers who had been told by a 
third-party defendant, a real estate agent, that the property they 
were purchasing comprised 22.75 acres, when in fact it comprised 
only 6.9 acres. The Utah Supreme Court in that case held that a 
claim for relief for negligent misrepresentation lies in tort in 
under those facts. The facts in the instant case likewise clearly 
establish the elements of negligent misrepresentation. 
POINT X. 
ONCE HE MADE A PARTIAL DISCLOSURE 
RELATING TO THE DEFECTIVE NATURE OF 
THE STUCCO ON THE PARAPETS, JARVIK 
WAS UNDER A DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO THE 
MAACKS ALL DEFECTS IN THE STUCCO 
Through his agent, Jarvik told the Maacks that the stucco on 
the parapets around the garage was defective. He also represented 
that he would fix this defect in this portion of the stucco. He, 
however, did not disclose the remaining defects in the stucco, 
including the improper utilization of a cement-based stucco, a 
material inappropriate for this climate, and the improper 
bbPrlce-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 
713 P.2d 55, 59 n.2 (Utah 1986). 
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application of that cement-based stucco without expansion joints. 
The stucco system was doomed to fail. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(b) states as follows: 
One party to a business transaction is 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
disclose to the other before the transaction 
is consummated, 
matters known to him that he knows to be 
necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous 
statement of the facts from being misleading. 
The Utah Supreme Court in First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Bamberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Utah 1990) 
specifically adopted this section of the Restatement. 
Jarvikfs partial disclosure relating to the stucco, while 
failing to disclose other defects in the stucco of which he was 
acutely aware, subjects him to liability for nondisclosure. 
POINT XI. 
JARVIK IS LIABLE TO THE MAACKS FOR 
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
The "as is" clause in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement does 
not eliminate Jarvikfs liability for either the collateral 
agreements or for his fraudulent concealment.87 Jarvik cannot 
87See Tibbitts v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 
(1967). 
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stand behind a "as is" provision as a shield to his fraudulent 
concealment or his collateral agreements. 
In order to prevent them from obtaining an inspection of the 
property, Jarvik represented to the Maacks that the property was 
under a builder's warranty. An inspection by a general contractor, 
as the Maacks intended, would have revealed the defects in the 
stucco and other parts of the residence.88 Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 550 entitled "Liability for Fraudulent Concealment" 
reads as follows: 
One party to a transaction who by concealment 
or other action intentionally prevents the 
other from acquiring material information is 
subject to the same liability to the other, 
for pecuniary loss as though he had stated the 
nonexistence of the matter that the other was 
thus prevented from discovering. 
If Jarvik had not represented to the Maacks that a builder's 
warranty would cover all defects in materials and construction, the 
Maacks would have had the house inspected by a competent general 
contractor. This would have revealed the defects in controversy. 
Jarvik?s action in intentionally dissuading the Maacks from 
obtaining an inspection of the property subjects Jarvik to 
liability to the Maacks for fraudulent concealment. 
Further, even absent Jarvik's interference in obtaining an 
Thompson Affidavit (R. 1771-74). 
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inspection of the property, the defects concerning the stucco in 
terms of its selection and application were not reasonably within 
the knowledge of both parties. In this situation, 
misrepresentation may be either by affirmative statement or by 
material omission. Jarvik was obviously in possession of the facts 
relating to the inadequate materials and application of the stucco. 
His failure to disclose that information constitutes an actionable 
fraud.89 
In Moore v. Swanson, 556 P. 2d 1249 (Mont. 1976), plaintiff 
Moore, as buyer, brought an action against defendants Swanson, as 
sellers, to rescind a contract or alternatively to recover money 
damages. Moore was purchasing the Alpine Village Motel. During 
the negotiations, defendants specifically told plaintiff that the 
motel fully complied with Triple A standards. The contract, 
however, only required plaintiff to maintain the hotel's membership 
with the American Automobile Association during the term of the 
contract and had no affirmative language that the motel met a 
Triple A rating. Before the plaintiff took possession of the 
premises, defendants received a written deficiency notice from the 
Association that certain improvements were required, and defendants 
did not communicate this information to the plaintiff. The 
89Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
1980). 
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defendant raised the "as is" disclaimer clause in the contract as 
a bar to plaintiff's recovery of repair damages to bring the motel 
into compliance with the Triple A standards. The Supreme Court of 
Montana rejected the argument, stating: 
The "as is" disclaimer clause regarding 
condition of premises does not bar plaintiff's 
recovery of repair damages. Defendants 
represented to plaintiff that the motel was in 
all respects in compliance with Triple A 
standards, when in fact it was not. The 
district court correctly found this 
representation to be material to the 
transaction and a matter contributing to a 
partial failure of consideration on 
defendants' part. Therefore, damages are 
appropriate to compensate the plaintiff. . . . 
Id. at 1253. 
Furthermore, in Lusk Corp. v. Burges, 85 Ariz. 90, 332 P.2d 
493, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that "it is . . .a well-
settled rule that a person cannot free himself from fraud by 
incorporating a clause like the one above [an integration clause] 
in a contract. . . . " Id. at 495. In that case, the contract 
between the parties contained a provision that it covered all 
agreements expressed or implied between the parties. 
Likewise in P.E.A.C.E. Corp. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 568 
P. 2d 1273 (Okl. 1977), the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that a 
"waiver of defense" clause in a contract would apply only to an 
action on the contract, and not to a tort cause of action, 
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including a tort based upon fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 
1276. 
There is no case law supporting Jarvik's position that the 
contractual language in the Earnest Money Agreement bars the tort-
based causes of action. 
POINT XII. 
THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER DOES NOT 
EXTINGUISH THE UNDERLYING CLAIMS 
BASED UPON FRAUD 
The doctrine of merger is set forth in paragraph 0 of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement. The Utah Court of Appeals in 
G.G.R., Inc. v. Leventls, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989), described 
the exceptions to the doctrine of merger as follows: 
The doctrine of merger provides that upon 
delivery and acceptance of a deed, the 
provisions of the underlying contract for the 
conveyance are deemed extinguished or 
superseded by the deed. Secor v. Knight, 716 
P. 2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986). However, there are 
several exceptions to this doctrine, including 
fraud, mistake and existence of collateral 
rights in the contract of sale. Id. at 
793. . . . 
Id. at 844 (emphasis added). 
The two claims against Jarvik for fraudulent concealment both 
came under the fraud exception of the merger doctrine. The cause 
of action based upon breach of contract and breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing are collateral rights in the contract 
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of sale. 
The best evidence that the agreements set forth in the First 
Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint are collateral is 
the other collateral agreements into which the parties entered, 
including the agreement to fix the defective stucco on the parapet 
and the agreement to fix the punch list of items prior to closing. 
CONCLUSION 
A second purchaser of a home has a cause of action against a 
contractor who engages in shoddy and negligent construction 
practices, resulting in defects in the home. Generally speaking, 
a home is the single largest personal investment any individual 
undertakes. To suggest that this substantial investment is not 
subject to the normal laws by which everyone else governs 
themselves -- such as negligence and strict liability -- undermines 
the security of that investment for every homeowner in the state of 
Utah who purchased their home from a prior owner. The implied 
warranty of habitability also should protect that investment. 
There was no meeting of the minds between the Maacks and 
Resource Design concerning the payment for remedial repairs. 
Consequently, Resource Design's claims in its Counterclaim for 
breach of express or implied contract must fail. 
See Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranch & Livestock Co. , 
706 P.2d 1028, 1037-38 (Utah 1985). 
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Jarvik made certain representations to the Maacks that the 
home was covered by a builder's warranty. He knew of defects in 
the home, including the improper application of a cement-based 
stucco which was an inappropriate building material for this 
climate. He, however, concealed those defects. In an effort to 
shield himself from these misrepresentations and fraudulent 
concealment, Jarvik relies upon contractual provisions, such as the 
"as is" provision and the doctrine of merger. Contractual 
provisions, however, cannot shield a party from tort-based claims. 
To adopt such a policy essentially would sanction fraud. 
This Court should reverse the District Court Orders dismissing 
the Maacks1 claims for relief against Hoagland, Resource Design and 
Jarvik and remanding those claims for trial. Further, this Court 
should reverse the District Court's denial of the Maacks1 Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on Resource Design's Counterclaim's 
First Claim for Relief. 
Dated: November 23, 1992. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
faaittc A. L a r s e n 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack 
Mu, A. 
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Tab A 
NOV 0 8 1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and 
JUDITH D. MAACK, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah 
corporation and 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual 
Defendants. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. a Utah 
corporation, and TIMOTHY 
HOAGLAND, an individual 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS1 
MOTION TO DISMISS, PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE, AND 
THE SCHEDULE OF THE CASE 
Civil No. 900903201CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
On October 25, 1991, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second 
and Third Claims for Relief and Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate 
came on for hearing before the above-captioned Court, the Honorable 
Pat B. Brian presiding. Robert D. Maack and Martin R. Denney 
appeared and represented plaintiffs. Kurt M. Frankenburg appeared 
O0°C4S 
and represented defendants. John B. Maycock appeared and 
represented third-party defendant Robert Jarvik. Based upon the 
argument of counsel, the Motions and Memorandum filed in support 
and opposition thereto, and the Court being fully advised, it is 
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. An Objection to the Proposed Order was filed and resolved 
by telephonic conference on November 7, 1991; by executing this 
Order on the "Approved as to form" line, each party preserves his 
objections, but acknowledges the Courtfs resolution of the 
objections are reflected in this Order. 
2. Because plaintiffs have not and could not plead privity 
of contract and Utah has not adopted any implied warranties 
relating to the construction of residential property, defendants1 
Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs1 Second Claim for Relief is 
granted with prejudice and without leave to amend. 
3. Because plaintiffs have not plead misrepresentation with 
specificity, defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Third Claim for 
Relief is granted without prejudice and with leave to amend the 
Complaint. 
4. Plaintiff's oral motion to state additional claims in the 
First Amended Complaint is granted only to the extent that 
plaintiffs are granted leave to amend the Third Claim for Relief; 
to state additional claims, plaintiffs must file a Motion to Amend. 
2 
5. Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate is denied on the sole 
ground that the defendant Robert Jarvik has not been served in 
Civil No. 910905638CN. 
6. All written discovery is to be completed on or before 
December 20, 1991, at 5:00 p.m.; written discovery shall be served 
sufficiently in advance to require responses by that deadline. 
7. All dispositive motions are to be filed on or before 
December 24, 1991 at 5:00 p.m. (with service by hand delivery if 
the motions are filed on that date). 
8. Prior to the Pre-Trial Conference, counsel and the 
parties are to engage in meaningful discussions regarding 
settlement and candidly assess the strengths and weaknesses of each 
of their cases. 
9. Counsel and parties shall attend a Pre-Trial Conference 
on January 9, 1992, at 8:30 a.m. 
10. The trial in this case is set for the five (5) days 
beginning on January 27, 1992, at 9:00 a.m. 
DATED: November 7\ 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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Approved as to form: 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
-fa&fos 
<ooert S. Campbell, Jr. 
Martin R. Denney 
Mark A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Gary B. Ferguson 
Kurt M. Frankenburt 
Attorneys for Defendants 
JOHN B. MAYCOCK LAW OFFICES 
Jofcn B. Maycock j 
A£>corney for Third-Party Defendant 
maack\order2.mot 
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GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062) 
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
By. 
FILES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 2 0 1992 
Deputy Clark 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
MAACK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND CONTINUING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESSES 
FROM TESTIFYING AT TRIAL 
Civil NO. 900903201CV 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
and TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D. 
Third-Party Defendant. 
On April 8, 1992 at 1:00 p.m., Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Exclude Defendants' Expert 
Witnesses from Testifying at Trial came on for hearing before the 
0C2286 
above-captioned court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. 
Mark A. Larsen appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Kurt M. 
Frankenburg appeared on behalf of defendants Resource Design & 
Construction, Inc. and Timothy Hoagland. Paul D. Newman appeared 
on behalf of third-party defendant Eagar & Company. Robert K. 
Jarvik appeared telephonically on his own behalf. 
Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda and affidavits on 
file and having heard oral argument presented on behalf of all 
parties, and good cause appearing, the Court finds as follows: 
1. Work was requested by the plaintiffs. 
2. Work was performed by defendant Resource Design 
pursuant to plaintiffs' requests. 
3. Subsequent to the performance of the work Resource 
Design submitted a bill to plaintiffs. 
4. Prior to the performance of the work plaintiffs and 
defendant Resource Design had no conversations as to whether or 
not the work was being performed pursuant to a warranty or other 
agreement, either between the builder and the plaintiffs or the 
builder and some third party. 
5. A dispute exists as to whether Resource Design 
performed the work expecting to be paid and whether plaintiffs 
knew or should have known that Resource Design expected to be 
paid for the work performed. 
6. The Counterclaim of defendant Resource Design & 
Construction, Inc. is adequate to meet the notice requirements in 
this jurisdiction. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
relating to the First Cause of Action in defendant Resource 
Design & Construction, Inc.'s Counterclaim is denied. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Defendants' Expert 
Witnesses is continued pending resolution of defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment scheduled for hearing on May 6, 1992. 
DATED this <&L day of 1992. 
t^ 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN ' //J$^ 
District Court Judge 
5ATNA.0009U2366 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss, 
) 
Mary C. Wardell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for 
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs herein; that she served the 
attached ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND CONTINUING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE DEFENDANTS' 
EXPERT WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING AT TRIAL (Case No. 900903201CV, 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County) upon the parties 
listed below by placing them in an envelope addressed to: 
Robert K. Jarvik, M.D. (Via First Class Mail) 
124 West 60th Street 
New York, New York 1002 3 
Robert D. Maack (Via Hand Delivery) 
Mark A. Larsen 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
2 01 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul D. Newman, Esq. (Via Hand Delivery) 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorneys for Eagar & Company, Inc. 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing them to be mailed via First Class Mail, with postage 
prepaid thereon, or personally hand delivered as indicated above, 
on the JO day of April, 1992. 
CckdiA. 
KaryfCJ Wardell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me thi 
1992. 
NOT/ 
Residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
Notary Public otary PUDIIC • 
SHARON M. ALLHANDS 1 257 East 200 So, Suite 500 | 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8414f 
My Commission Expires 
August 8,1 993 | 
State of Utah . 
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/ 
Robert J a r v i k , M.D. 
124 W 60 S t r e e t 
New York, NY 10023 
Te lephone: (212) 265-8172 
FILED MSTRiGT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 1 9 1992 
M Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
D. MAACK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION 
INC., a Utah Company, and 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual 
Defendants. 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
D. MAACK 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D. 
Defendant 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
it 
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JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 900903201CV 
Consolidated Cases 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
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The Court, having made its rule 52 Statement and Order, 
which are incorporated herein by this reference, hereby enters 
judgement against Plaintiffs for no cause of action, on each and 
every claim asserted against Defendant Robert Jarvik. Pursuant to 
Rule 54(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, costs are awarded to 
defendant Jarvik in the amount of $ v . 
Pursuant to defendant's affidavit submitted in accord with 
Rule 4-505, the Court awards legal fees in the amount of $ S 
to defendant Jarvik. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PAT B^-^KIAN 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid on 
this 11th day of May, 1992, to the following: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
One Utah Center — 1300 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
K.M. Frankenburg, Esq. 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
PO Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Michael F. Heyrend # 1480 
310 "E,f Street 5 ^ ^ 1 1 M $ : 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Paul D. Newman 
Snell & Wilmer 
60 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
j*> 
Robert Jarvik, M.D. 
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Robert Jarvik, M.D. 
124 W 60 Street 
New York, NY 10023 
Telephone: (212) 265-8172 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
D. MAACK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION 
INC., a Utah Company, and 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual 
Defendants. 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
D. MAACK 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D. 
Defendant 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
RULE 52 STATEMENT OF 
GROUNDS AND ORDER FOR 
GRANTING DEFENDANT ROBERT 
JARVIK1S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS 
Consolidated Cases 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
Civil No. 900903201CV 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgement filed by Defendant Robert 
Jarvik ("Jarvik") on or about March 24, 1992, came on for 
hearing before the Court, pursuant to notice, on May 7, 1992, 
Plaintiff Robert D. Maack was present and represented by counsel, 
Mark A. Larsen, Plaintiff Judith D. Maack was represented by 
1 
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counsel, Michael F. Heyrend, Defendant Resource Design & 
Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design") and Timothy Hoagland were 
represented by counsel, Kurt M. Frankenburg, Defendant Jarvik 
represented himself and participated over the telephone, and 
Third-Party Defendant Eagar & Company was represented by counsel, 
Paul D. Newman. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda filed by 
the parties and considered the arguments presented at the 
hearing, bases its decision on the following grounds: 
2. There is no genuine dispute with respect to the following 
material facts: 
A. During 1986, Jarvik entered a contract with Resource 
Design for the construction of a home (the "Home") located on Lot 
N. 5, White Hill Estates, Phase 2, which was substantially 
completed by August, 1987. 
B. Jarvik entered into sales-agency contracts for the 
sale of the property with Eagar on November 4, 1987, and April 
14, 1988. 
C. Plaintiffs executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
("Agreement") on July 26, 1988, whereby they offered to purchase 
the Home from Jarvik. 
D. Jarvik accepted and signed the Agreement on July 27, 
1988. 
E. The Agreement contains the following pertinent 
provisions: 
(1) 1(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a 
visual inspection of the property and subject to 
Section 1(c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its 
present physical condition, except: none. 
(2) 6. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties 
contained in Section C, the following items are also 
warranted: [blank] 
(3) 7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. 
This offer is made subject to the following special 
2 
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conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
prior to closing: This offer may be accepted in 
counterpart. 
(4) 11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE 
INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTIONS ON THE 
REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND 
SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY 
REFERENCE. 
F. The Agreement contains the following pertinent General 
Provisions: 
(1) B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, 
Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property 
upon Buyer's own examination and judgement and not by 
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller 
or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its 
condition, size, location, present value, future value, 
income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts 
the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's 
warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer 
desires any additional inspection, said inspection 
shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by 
Buyer. 
(2) C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: 
(a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any 
building or zoning violation concerning the property 
which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; 
(b) all obligations against the property including 
taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens, or other 
encumbrances of any nature shall be brought current on 
or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning, and ventilating systems, electrical 
systems, and appliances shall be sound or in 
satisfactory working condition at closing. 
(3) L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT-NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. 
This instrument constitutes the entire agreement 
between the parties and supercedes and cancels any and 
all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, 
understandings, or agreements between the parties. 
There are no oral agreements which modify or affect 
this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except 
by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
(4) N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
. . . Both parties agree that should either party default in 
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or 
002142 
accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in 
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, 
whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. 
3. Plaintiffs do not claim and there is no evidence that there 
were any subsequent mutual written agreements between Plaintiffs 
and Jarvik or Plaintiffs and Eagar. 
4. Plaintiff Robert D. Maack is an attorney licensed to 
practice law in the State of Utah, and has practiced law in the 
State of Utah for many years. 
5. Plaintiffs claim that prior to the execution of the 
Agreement, Plaintiffs were informed by Maclyn Kesselring of Eagar 
that there was a "builder's warranty" covering the Home, and that 
based upon that representation, Plaintiffs did not have a general 
contractor inspect the Home on their behalf. 
6. The Agreement does not condition Plaintiffs1 offer to 
purchase the Home upon the performance an inspection or on an 
acceptable inspection report. 
7. Plaintiffs did not ask for a copy of the "builder's 
warranty". 
8. The Agreement does not condition Plaintiffs' offer to 
purchase the Home upon the existence of a "builder's warranty". 
4 
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9. Following purchase of the Home, the plaintiffs made demands 
upon the defendant's contractor to correct alleged defects in the 
Home and sued the defendant for Breach of Contract and other 
claims, stating that they relied upon oral representations made 
by the realtor that there was a one-year builders' warranty and 
that "remedial repair work ... should have been covered by a one-
year builder's warranty." (First Amended Complaint paragraphs 6-
12) 
10. BASED UPON the above facts, the Court concludes as follows: 
(a). The Agreement is clear and unambiguous. 
(b). The Agreement is properly executed. 
(c) . The court finds absolutely no misrepresentation or 
fraud. 
(d) . Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy of the alleged 
"builder's warranty" and failure to obtain an inspection 
constituted conduct below the level of ordinary diligence. 
(e). Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy of the "builder's 
warranty" and failure to condition their offer to purchase the 
Home on the existence of a "builder's warranty" indicate that 
Plaintiffs did not treat the representation as material and did 
not rely upon the representation when they purchased the Home. 
(f) . The integration clause of the Agreement at Paragraph L 
of the General Provisions entitled "COMPLETE AGREEMENT- NO ORAL 
AGREEMENTS", is clear and unambiguous, and precludes any claims 
5 
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Plaintiffs may have with regard to all oral agreements and all 
prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings 
or agreements not expressly stated in the Agreement, whether made 
by Jarvik or Eagar. 
(g). One of the covenants of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement was to honor Paragraph L. Attempts by the plaintiffs to 
enforce an alleged "builder's warranty" based on Eagarfs oral 
representations made prior to closing constitute a default of 
that covenant. 
(h). Dr. Jarvik and Eagar are exculpated based on the total 
written agreement. 
11. Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby grants Jarvik1s 
Motion for Summary Judgement on each of the claims asserted 
against him by the Plaintiffs. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 1992. 
6 
0021 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid on 
this 11th day of May, 1992, to the following: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
One Utah Center — 1300 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
K.M. Frankenburg, Esq. 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
PO Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Michael F. Heyrend # 1480 
310 "E" Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Paul D. Newman 
Snell & Wilmer 
60 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
V H P U ^ * ^ 
Robert Jarvik, M.D. 
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GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062) 
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
FRED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 7 1992 
A , S^LT U«tt COUNTY 
T 
2MJJ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
MAACK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
RULE 52 STATEMENT OF GROUNDS 
AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
Civil No. 900903201CV 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
and TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D. 
Third-Party Defendant. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Resource 
Design & Construction, Inc. and Timothy Hoagland on or about 
March 25, 1992, came on for hearing before the Court, pursuant to 
notice, on May 6 and 7, 1992. Plaintiff Robert D. Maack was 
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present representing himself and being represented by counsel, 
Mark A. Larsen. Plaintiff Judith D. Maack was represented by 
counsel, Michael F. Heyrend and Robert D. Maack. Defendant 
Resource Design & Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design") and 
Timothy Hoagland were represented by counsel, Kurt M. Frankenburg 
of Williams & Hunt. Defendant Jarvik appeared pro se and 
participated telephonically in the hearings. Third-Party 
Defendant Eagar & Company was represented by counsel, Paul D. 
Newman of Snell & Wilmer. The Court, having reviewed the 
motions, memoranda and supporting materials filed by the parties, 
having considered the arguments presented at the hearing, and 
good cause appearing, bases its decision on the following 
grounds: 
There is no genuine dispute with respect to the following 
material facts: 
1. Defendant Resource Design & Construction, Inc. 
("Resource Design") has been a Utah corporation in good standing 
since approximately 1979. Resource Design is in the business of 
construction contracting, primarily in the areas of custom 
residential homes and light commercial buildings. 
2. Plaintiff Robert D. Maack is an attorney licensed to 
practice law in the State of Utah, and has practiced law in the 
State of Utah for many years. 
3. In early 1986 Dr. Robert Jarvik (defendant and third-
party defendant) approached Resource Design to request that it 
2 
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build him a personal residence at 432 6 White Way in Salt Lake 
City. 
4. Dr. Jarvik subsequently contacted a professional house 
designer. Dr. Jarvik presented his own drawings of the house he 
wanted to build to the house designer who then assisted Jarvik in 
preparing the plans. 
5. On or about July 1, 1986, Resource Design entered a 
standard form agreement between owner and contractor with Dr. 
Jarvik to construct a home for Jarvik. 
6. Resource Design completed construction of Jarvik7s home 
one year later, in early July, 1987. Dr. Jarvik was very 
satisfied with the work done by Resource Design and made final 
payment and acceptance under the construction contract. 
7. Due to a job change, Dr. Jarvik moved from Salt Lake 
City to New York City in the summer of 1987. He consequently 
listed the completed home for sale. 
8. Dr. Jarvik arranged to have someone live in the home 
through the winter of 1987-1988 and subsequently rented the home 
for a short period of time in the summer of 1988. 
9. On July 26, 1988 plaintiffs Robert and Judith Maack 
contacted the listing agent on Jarvik's home and, after looking 
at the house, entered into a Earnest Money Sales Agreement for 
the full asking price. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
specified that plaintiffs were purchasing the home "as is" 
without any warranties as to its condition. 
3 
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10. On July 27, 1988, Robert Jarvik signed and accepted the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
11. Prior to purchasing the home, plaintiffs did not have a 
general contractor, professional inspector, or anyone else 
inspect the Home on their behalf. 
12. Although Plaintiffs claim they were informed by Maclyn 
Kesselring of Eagar that there was a "builder's warranty" 
covering the Home, plaintiffs did not ask for any written 
evidence of the "builder's warranty" nor did they include any 
reference to a builder's warranty in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. 
13. After plaintiffs executed the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement they first learned that the house had been built by 
Resource Design & Construction, Inc. 
14. Plaintiffs' first contact with Resource Design or Tim 
Hoagland came on or about August 30, 1988, when Mr. Hoagland sent 
plaintiffs a letter on the stationery of "Resource Design & 
Construction, Inc." 
15. After closing on the house and moving in, plaintiffs 
asked Resource Design to perform certain work on their home. 
After Resource Design performed substantial work on plaintiffs' 
home, plaintiffs refused to pay for the work done. 
16. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges claims for 
negligence, strict liability, res ipsa loquitur, and 
misrepresentation against defendants Resource Design and 
Hoagland. 
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17. Plaintiffs do not claim that a contract ever existed 
between them and defendants Resource Design or Timothy Hoagland. 
BASED UPON the above undisputed facts, the Court concludes 
as follows: 
1. Defendants were not sellers or manufacturers of a 
product. Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs' strict 
liability claim. 
2. Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts indicating 
that defendants made any material misrepresentations of fact or 
otherwise. Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs' 
negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation claim. 
3. Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts indicating 
detrimental reliance by them upon alleged representations by 
defendants. Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs' 
negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation claim. 
4. Because there is no basis for plaintiffs' intentional 
misrepresentation claim, there can be and is no basis for 
plaintiffs' punitive damage claim. 
5. Defendants have no duty to plaintiffs which could make 
them liable for loss of use and enjoyment or costs of repair or 
replacement of plaintiffs' property. Therefore, there is no 
basis for plaintiffs' negligence and res ipsa loquitur claims. 
5. Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy or written 
evidence of a "builder's warranty", their failure to condition 
their offer to purchase the Home on the existence of a "builder's 
warranty" or on the receipt of an acceptable inspection report, 
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especially in light of Robert Maack's professional training, 
clearly shows, and a reasonable jury could not find otherwise, 
that plaintiffs did not exercise ordinary, reasonable diligence. 
BASED UPON the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by Resource Design & Construction, 
Inc. and Defendant Timothy Hoagland on each and every claim 
asserted against them by plaintiffs. 
DATED this J 7 day of \X //^?^^ , 1992. 
,IWTHTC eoirarn 
*
 / r
^ "
 c
 ^ , 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRTATT District Court Judge W$t\ 
5ATNA.0009M3332 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
Mary C. Wardell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendants 
and third-party plaintiffs Resource Design & Construction, Inc. 
and Timothy Hoagland herein; that she served the attached RULE 52 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS in Case No. 900903201CV 
before the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Robert K. Jarvik, M.D. (Via First Class Mail) 
124 West 60th Street 
New York, New York 10023 
Robert D. Maack (Via Hand Delivery) 
Mark A. Larsen 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
2 01 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul D. Newman, Esq. (Via Hand Delivery) 
SNELL & WILMER 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael R. Heyrend, Esq. (Via Hand Delivery) 
310 E Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
or personally hand-delivered, as indicated above, on the 
day of May, 1992. ,o X V *) 
Mary C. Wardell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
1992 
Notary Public ^ • 
SHARON M ALLHANDS 1 
-rt7 c - - t o " ~ ^ Suite 500 I 
^ -h 84145 J 
dJ- day of May, 
minfitt 
Residing in Salt Lak 
County, State of Utah 
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THE AMERICAN TF n F ARCHITECTS 
AIA Document A "I 11 
Standard rorm of Agreement Between 
Ownpr and Contractor 
wr.ere the oasis of payment is the 
CHST OF TiH \VORK PLUS \ ITT 
1978 EDITION 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LECAL CONSEQUENCES; CONSULTATION WITH 
AN A1JORNEY IS ENCOURAGED WITH RESPECT TO ITS COMPLETION OR MODIFICATION 
Use only with the 7976 Edition of Al A Document A201, General Conditions oi the Contract for Construction, 
This document has been approved and endorsed by The Associated General Contactors of America 
AGREEMENT 
made as of the Z^^CST^ 
Hundred and 
day of J ^ / / in the year of Nineteen 
BETWEEN the Owner: ROBERT JARVIK 
a .1 II it, Lui i In U L I U I RESOURCE DESIGN I JUNSTRUCTION /UOl TJJi UUAJLAND 
the 
Copyri 
*%'fdi .^i Torm oe low. 
• *g^> 
', 1974. © 1978 by The \ m l r i c a n Institule of Architects, 1735 New York Avenue. I \.\ " ,„ 
it<»rttl K**f^ if» f\e iiiKtlinlVll nnntltinn o( it* nrny>«>mnt uji'lkniit r\«*mi«c «.«.•% - : A t A v-uMynjjni i ^ u x j j y a r ; i ^ y r ^ j o , 1301, I ^ O J , / I ^ D / , i v /« , w 17/0 oy m e / \m«ncan in ju iu i c 01 Arcnuecis, I / J J new" T O « Avenue, r .\ Washington, D.C. 200QfrrRcproductioo of the material herein or substanftv quotation of its provisions w i thout permission of the AIA 
violates the copyright laws of the United States and will be subject to legal prosecution. 
AIA DOCUMENT A111 • COST-PLUS OWNER-CONTRACTOR ACREEMENF • NINTH EDITION • Al»Rll 1973 • * rA# 
© 197U • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE O f ARCHITECTS. 1735 NEW YO'RJC AVE N.W., WASHINGTON, D -' A11MCT ri n 1 r- 2 7 
J ) 
THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
1.1 The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement, the Conditions of the Contract (General, Supplementary 
and other Conditions), the Drawings, the Specifications, all Addenda issued prior to and all Modifications 
issued after execution of this Agreement. These form the Contract, and all are as fully a part of the Contract 
as if attached to this Agreement or repeated herein. An enumeration of the Contract Documents appears in 
Article 16. If anything in the Contract Documents is inconsistent with this Agreement, the Agreement shall 
govern. 
ARTICLE 2 
THE WORK 
2,1 The Contractor shall perform all the Work required by the Contract: Documents for 
(Here insert the caption descriptive nf the Work .;« iitccJ1 on it her Cunt net Documents.) 
PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS PREPARED BI ROBERT J ARVIK (OWNER) ill I) 
TODD ANDERSON (DESIGNER) FOR JARVIK RESIDENCE SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
A RTI CLE 2 
Tl IE CON I RAC I OR S DUTIES AND S I A • • > 
3.1 The Contractor accepts the relationship of trust and confidence established betw, - a,,u u,c 
this Agreement. He covenants with the Owner to furnish his best skill and judgment and to coopei ate \ vith* 
the Architect in furthering the interests of the Owner. He agrees to furnish efficient business administra-
tion and superintendence and to use his best efforts to furnish at all times an adequate supply of workmen 
and materials, and to perform the Work in the best way and in the most expeditious and economical manner 
consistent with the interests of the Owner. 
4.1 
TIME Or v. • ' -\^ 
Tl me V oi I : to be per fo r m o H 
t t 'N < Af\L> MjL i^ 
Substantial Completion shall be achieved not i j i c i iun 
(Here insert any sped*! provisions lor liquidated . f j r - j ' c i . . 
/E3. 
and, subject to authorized adjustments; 
FINISHED DEFINED AS COMPLETE AND OCCUFIABLE 
ONLY EXCEPTIONS E] : TERIOR WORK WHICH .MUST REMAIN TO THE FOLLOWING SPRING DUE 
TO WEATHER. 
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5.1 The Owner agrees to reimburse the Contractor for b.c ^:>i ! • » c...— ... Article 8. Such 
reimbursement shall be in addition, to the Contractor's Fee stipub;-: i r 
5.2 The maximum cost to the Owner, including the Cost: of the Work and the Contractor's Fee, is guaranteed not 
to exceed the sum of dollars 
($ ); such Guaranteed Maximum Cost shall be increased or decreased for Changes In 
the Work as provided in Article 7. 
(Here insert any provision lor distribution o/ i , " t J ii'h 5 2 tt there is no Lu*r*nteed Maximum Cost) 
NO GUARANTEED MAXIMUM 
TARGET FIGURE FOR ALL COSTS EXCLUSIVE OF COBPPRAnT^-S FKF TH $17 r i , I I 
ARTICLE 6 
CONTRACTOR'S FEE 
6,1 In consideration of the performance of the Contract, the Owner agrees to pay the Conlractor in current funds 
as compensation for his services a Contractor's Fee as follow < fs: 
FEE OF $28,000.00 I" r 'MPLETEP WI'T'!'1 " b MONTHS 
.i $27,000.00 " " 7 MONTHS 
$25,000.00 " " 3 MONTHS 
$23,000.00 ff " 9 MONTHS 
$20,000.00 ff " * j.0 MONTHS 
6.2 Ft '" |, '" , i, J,i i" •, I LI !,:" 1.11,a 11 Ij e adJ u s I c d ai Io 111• w s : 
NONE 
i ne Contractor shall be paid percent { %) of the proportional amount 
of his Fee with each progress payment, and the balance of his Fee shall be paid at the time of final payment. 
$2,500.00 PER MONTH FOR 8 MONTHS AND REMAINDER UPON COMPLETION BEGINNING JULY 1 
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7.1 The Owner may make Changes in tre Work a, provu>-i . . act Documents. The Contractor shall be 
reimbursed for Changes In the Wi > or trie basis or Cost or the Work as defined in Article 8 
7.2 The Contractor's Fee for Changes in the Work shall be as set forth in Paragraph 6.2, or in the absence of spe-
cific provisions therein, shall be adjusted by negotiation on the basis of the Fee established for the original 
Work, 
ARTICLE 8 
COSTS TO BE REIMBURSED 
Fhe term Cost of the Work shall mean costs necessarily incurred in the proper performance of the Work and 
paid by the Contractor. Such costs shall be at rates not higher than the standard paid in the locality of the 
Work except with prior consent of the Owner, and shall include the items set forth below in this Article 8. 
8 1 1 Wages paid for labor in the direct employ of the Contractor in the performance of the Work under applicable 
collective bargaining agreements, or under a salary or wage schedule agreed upon by the Owner and Contrac-
t s and including such welfare or other benefits, if any, as may be payable with respect thereto. 
8 1 2 Salaries of Contractor's personnel when stationed at the field office, in whatever capacity employed. Personnel 
engaged, at shops or on the road, in expediting the production or transportation of materials or equipment, 
shall be considered as stationed at the field office and their salaries paid for that portion of their time spent 
on this Work, 
8 I 3 Cost of contributions, assessments or taxes incurred during the performance of the Work for such items as 
unemployment compensation and social security, insofar as such cost is based on wages, salaries, or other 
remuneration paid to employees of the Contractor and included in the Cost of the Work under Subparagraphs 
8.1.1 and 8.1.2. 
. o portion of reasonable travel and subsistence expenses o. ~~ — * . -. ^. . •-. -,..n.<..> <; : 
-red while traveling in discharge of duties connected ^ * * e^ W o r k r c n o e x c e p t "by STDec r o v a l 
-OSt of all materials,, supplies and equipment incorpora^ * > >* , - -c r,n :,ts rs-> :-j"i^or;ai:or. 
hereof. 
Payments made by the Contractor to Subcontractors tot Work perrorme I 
Agreement. 
-lost, including transportation and maintenance, of all materials, supplies, equipment, temporary facilities and 
nand tools not owned by the workers, which are consumed in the performance of the Work, and cost less 
salvage value on such items used but not consumed which remain the property of the Contractor, 
Rental charges of all necessary machinery and equipment, exclusive of hand tools, used at: the site of the 
Work, whether rented from the Contractor or others, including installation, minor repairs and replacements, 
dismantling, removal, transportation and delivery costs thereof, at rental charges consistent with those pi e-
vailing in the area. 
ost of premiums fo- aK l> .- • nruments 
"jrchase and • 
Sales, use or similar taxes re.-i:et. - »VD'K J -J , *.. * - wOntr^cu .ab'o ir-;,nscc: t\ arv govern-
mental authority. 
• ? -m 11 fees, roya 11ies, damages ior ii \ ir\ ngemen t of pa ten ts and •'. I • ill 11 ini I i I  11 ' i ill1', III I i II < I e p o * i i ms 
' ii" causes other than the Contractor's negligence. 
mosses and expenses, not compensated by insurance or otherwise, sustained by the Contractor in connection 
with the Work, provided they have resulted from causes other than the fault or neglect of the Contractor. 
Such losses shall include settlements made with the written consent and approval of the Owner. No such 
losses and expenses shall be included in the Cost of the Work for the purpose of determining the Contrac-
tor's Fee. If, however, such,,,loss requires reconstruction and the Contractor is placed in charge thereof,, he 
shall be paid for his services a fee proportionate to that stated in Paragraph 6.1. 
8. 1.13 Minor expenses such as telegrams, loa& rihra nee telephone caiU^toUphone settee e» ri^tfe, expressage, and 
similar petty cash items in connection with the Work. 
8 1,14 Cost of removal of all debris. 
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8.1.15 Costs incurred due to ai i emergency affecting the safety of persons and property. 
8.1.16 Other costs incurred in the performance of the Work: if and to the extent: approved in advance in writing by 
the Owner. NONE 
(Here insert modifications or 
to the Work J 
pment rental charc.es and small tool charges applicable 
C O S T S 'it K t i -
r h e term Cost of the Work shall no t inc iuue any <.;; the items
 a«. i<; " ut * - ti \ 
9.1.1 Salaries or other compensation of the Contractor's personnel at the Contractors f* *; ^ 
offices, o t h e r t h a n an . a c c o u n t i n g c l e r k , n o t t o e x c e e d $ 5 0 0 . 
9 1.2 Expenses of the Contractor's principal and branch offices other than the field office. 
9 1 3 Any part of the Contractor's capital expenses, including interest: on the Contractor's capital emploved fa *S 
Work. 
9 1.4 Except as specifically provided for in 5ubparagi ap 1 i 8.1 8 o ii i ic difi :atitc is 11 ei et: ::>, i ei itaI c: ::: s 
and equipment 
9,1,5 Overhead or general expenses of any kind except: as .may be expressly included in Ai tide 8. 
9 1 6 Costs due to the negligence of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by 
any of them, or for whose acts any of them may be liable, including but not limited to the correction of 
defective or nonconforming Work, disposal of materials and equipment wrongly supplied, or making good 
any damage to property. 
9 1 7 The cost of any item not specifically ai id ;cu ... Ai tide 8. 
9.1.8 Costs in excess of the Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, as set forth in Article 5 and .adjusted | :: in si itai t !:• :::) 
A r t i c l e 7 , 
FUEL FOR VEHICLES 
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ARTICLE 10' 
DISCOUNT'S,, REBATES AMD' REFUNDS 
10,1 All cash discounts shall accrue to the Contractor unless the Owner deposits funds with the Contractor with 
which to make payments, in which case the cash discounts shall accrue to the Owner. All trade discounts, 
rebates and refunds, and all returns from sale of surplus materials and equipment shall accrue to the Ow Tier, 
and the Contractor shall make provisions so that they can be secured. 
(Here insert any provisions relating to deposits by the Owner to permit the Contractor to obtain cash discounts.) 
h l \ U V . LL l i 
SUBCONTRACTS AND OTHER AGREEMENTS 
i i . * All portions of the Work that the Contractor's organization does not perform; shall be performed under Sub-
contracts or by other appropriate agreement with the Contractor. The Contractor shall request bids from Sub-
contractors and shall deliver such bids to the Architect. The Owner will then determine, with the advice.of the 
Contractor and subject to the reasonable objection of the Architect which bids will be accepted.arcSi^ecf 
All Subcontracts shall conform to the requirements of the Contract Documents. Subcontracts awarded on the 
basis of the cost of such work plus a fee shall also be subject to the provisions of this Agreement insofar as 
applicable. 
4K l i l l t ; 12 
ACCOUNTING RECORDS 
12.1 The Contractor shall check ail materials, equipment and labor entering into the Work and shall keep such full 
and detailed accounts as may be necessary for proper financial management under this Agreement, and the 
system shall be satisfactory to the Owner. The Owner shall be afforded access to all the Contractor's records, 
books, correspondence, instructions, drawings, receipts, vouchers, memoranda and similar data relating to this 
Contract, and the Contractor shall preserve all such records for a period of three years, or for si ich longer 
period as may be required by law, after the final payment. 
ARTICLE 13 
APPLICATIONS FOR PAYll IE! I I 
13.1 The Contractor shall, at least ten days before each payment falls due, deliver to the Architect an itemized 
statement, notarized if required, showing in complete detail all moneys paid out or costs incurred by him on 
account of the Cost of the Work during the previous month for which he is to be reimbursed under Article 5 
and the amount of the Contractor's Fee due as provided in Article 6, together with payrolls for all labor and 
such other data supporting the Contractor's right to payment for Subcontracts or materials as the Owner or 
the Architect may require 
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ARTICLE 14 
I! " a I \ LEI i TS 1" O THE CONTRACTOR 
14 1 The Architect will review the Contractor's Applications for Payment and will promptly take appropriate action 
thereon as provided in the Contract Documents. Such amount as he may recommend for payment shall be 
payable by the Owner not later than the 10 th day of the month. 
I I I I li i taking action on the Contractor's Applications for Payment, the Architect shall be entitled to rely on the 
accuracy and completeness of the information furnished by the Contractor and shall not be deemed to repre-
sent that he has made audits of the supporting data, exhaustive or continuous on-site inspections or that he 
has made any examination to ascertain how or for what purposes the Contractor has used the moneys previ-
ously paid on account of the Contract. 
1 12 Final payment, constituting the entire unpaid balance of the Cost: of tl le Work and of the Contract- , 
shall be paid by the Owner to the Contractor IQ lys after Substantial Compie f 
the Work unless otherwise stipulated in the Certificate of Substai itial C :::::)! pletion, provided the Work ha- * i 
completed, the Contract: fully performed, and final payment has I:: sei i i ecoi nmended by the Architect. 
14,3 Payments due and unpaid under the Contract Documents shall bear intei est from the date payment: is due at 
the rate entered below, or in the absence thereof, at the legal rate prevailii ig at the place of the Project 
(Here insert any rate ol interest agreed upon.) 
AT EITHER 10JS OR THE RATE ACTUALLY CHARGED TO THE CONTRACTOR 
(Usury laws and requirements under the federal Truth in Lending Act. similar state and local consumer credit laws and other regulations at the 
Owner's and Contractor's principal places ol business, the location ol the Pro/cci and elsewhere may afiect the validity ol this provision. Specific 
Icfial advice should he nhtained with retprct to deletion, modification, or other requirements such as written disclosures or waivers.) 
... , Jhe Conti act i i lay be terminated by the Contractor a-> provided in the uonti act Documents 
15.2 if the Owner terminates the Contract as provided in the Contract Documents, he shall reimburse the Con-
tractor for any unpaid Cost of the Work due him under Article 5, plus (1) the unpaid balance of the Fee com-
puted upon the Cost of the Work to the date of termination at the rate of the percentage named in Article 6, 
or (2) if the Contractor's Fee be stated as a fixed sum, such an amount as will increase the payments on 
account of his Fee to a sum which bears the same ratio to the said fixed sum as the Cost of the Work at the 
time of termination bears to the adjusted Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, otherwise to a reasonable esti-
mated Cost of the Work when completed. The Owner shall also pay to the Contractor fair compensation, 
either by purchase or rental at the election of the Owner, for any equipment retained. In case of such termi-
nation of the Contract the Owner shall further assume and become liable for obligations, commitments and 
unsettled claims that the Contractor has previously undertaken or incurred in good faith in connection with 
said Work. The Contractor shall, as a condition of receiving the payments referred to in this Article 15, execute 
and deliver alt such papers and take all such steps, including the legal assignment of his contractual rights, as 
the Owner may require for the purpose of fully vesting in himself the rights and benefits of the Contractor 
under such obligations or commitments. 
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\RNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (O) 
This la a legally binding cont ract Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
3 
REALTOR 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall Include all fixtures and any of the following Items If presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating, 
jonditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtalna and draperiea and rods, win-
w and door screens/storm doors, window blinds, awnings. Installed television antenna, walRo-waJI carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and tranamit-
"<s)( fencing .'trees and shrubs. 
3 , I N S P E C T I O N . Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and Judgment and not by reason 
any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value. Income herefrom or as 
is production. Buyer accepts the property In "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. in the event Buyer desires any additional Inspection. 
inspection snaJI.be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
S E I X ^ WARRANTIES' . Seller warrants tha t (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
will not' bVremedie5'prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
brought currenTonf or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in 
isfacton/working condition at closing. 
C O N D I T I O ^ OEjWELJ*. f e l l e r warrants 'that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
itinued use of .the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
CONDIT ION OP SEPT IC T A N K . Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's I :. • : mi 1 a jge i i g : : ::( < o. king oi don an :1 Seller 
no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets ail applicable government health and construction standards. 
ACCELERATION C L A U S E . Not less than five (5) days prior to closing. Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
s of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such Instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of aale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
~ove the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to dosing. In such case, 
earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It Is understood and agreed that If provisions for said "Due on Sale** clause are set forth 
; action 7 herein,' alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void, 
[l
 t I I E INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either en abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing. Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title. 
eafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defects) Is not curable through an escrow agree-
if dosing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
FITLE INSURANCE. If title Insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title Insurance to be issued 
- h title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and 
sumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any 
nat ion charge. 
IXISTINQ T E N A N T LEASES. 11 Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing 
?y of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection Is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior 
:r
»Q. Buyer shall take title aubject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied ai or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
CHANGES DURING T R A N S A C T I O N , During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes In any existing leases shall be macl 
ad Into, nor shall any aubstantiaJ alterations or Improvements-be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer, 
; oooifltf40 
~.,w w, A FOUR PAGE F O R M 
•»*MtWMtT 
E A HNI- r MONEY SALES AQHLL W L N 1 
1 ngonrt ., ; No(0) EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DA1F \MM-^ *^ 
1 , ,f f 
T 
The undersigned Buyer _ j T ' / £ - & £ < * / / ^ K ///£&(L/LS - — - ^ _ hereby deposits withBrokerage 
as EARNEST MONEY. the^L. ,n, of / £ * > J r V ^ l ^ ^ / / d S ^ X <*<^//4*p — Dollars ($ / r f A ^ . = * ! .) 
i the form nf — — — , .
 7 ————. 
hicb shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law <^p2f / s / y 
iroke/age f*hone Number \ JJ / // ir ke/a e 
OFFER TO PilffClWiE 
' DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONBY is grvento^secure and ap f^y
 0n the purchase of the* property situated a }{ m?~i[ 1JPROPERJY 
Wf&/Zj tisAfJy In the City of
 y/rfjf *XAJLIJ _ _ county of _ y/k^/" ^ L ^ ^ . Utah 
ubject to any restrictive Covenants, zoning regulations, utility M other easements or nghts of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
iccordance with SectioruG. Said property is owned by ^Cf£^^/ \IYAJ%£S£*S ^ _ a s sellers, and ismore particularly described 
CHECK APPLICABLE mX$&T&*^ J **^LcJ~^&Z£^ 
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D VacanlLot D Vacai^Acreage D Other _ £ 7 " * 
I jS" IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Commercial Ef Residential • Condo C3 Other . 
(a) Included Items.. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property. 
The followinggersonaj property shall also be included in this sale and conyeye4 under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to titi«- ML/Z faj^jL*Mt 
(b) Excluded Items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale:. ^ f e 2 ^ C ^ . _ . „ „ _ 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
SJ public sewer QJ connected 0 well O connected D other Jg electricity (2f connected 
Z3 septic tank Z2 connected 27 irrigation water / secondary system Q ingress & egress by private easement 
Z?other sanitary system _ „ _ * of shares Company _ fgj dedicated road 0 paved 
0 public water J2t connected D TV antenna D master antenna Q prewired 0 curb and gutter 
B private water Q connected £3 natural gas 0 connected Q other nghts _ 
^
 S u r w v # A certlf,ed $UPv6y Q s n a U b e furni$heC| at the expense of pnor to closing, J2 shall not be foinisi ut 
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical 
condition, except: ~^*&~TL^C^
 mmmm _.__„„.__»«_«_»_-^^ _ _ 
1
 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total Djurchase price tor the property « ^ O ; /H^^^LC^ /PylLjXUi- rUA-*&/ 
• 7 - f W < ^ ^ , ^ ( y*^>//e^> Dollars i% ^ f*?j^ &&0 .&? ^ h i A ^ i h / p ^ ^ f n . ^ 
/> #«#4> iJ& which represents the aforedescnbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: 
Z£>0j 6-0Ot ^ representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
• ^^ representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note., real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed b* buys 
which obligation bears interest at - % per annum with monthly bayments of $ _ _ _ « _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ . _ 
which Include: D principal; D interest; D taxes; D insurance; Q condo fees; Q other 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumeq by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at _ — % per annum with monthly payments of $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
which include. • principal, • interest Q taxes. • insurance; D condo fees; • other. 
^V^fzrxrJ p 
~±.,4yZJ£*L*~£* representing balance, if any, including(proceeds from a new mortgage loan, nr nollor fimnnng, trj ho paid Q3 failure 
'KtoP 
Other 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
II jy i is (equ.red to assume an underlying obligjUon (in which case Section F shall also apply) md/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best illoits 
>ume indior procure sam^
 a nd this offer Is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees 
iake application within / ^ — days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to as,sume the underlying oblioation and/or obtain the new financing at 
merest rate not to exceed _ %. if Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within /Jjjf ttTSKJut**^
 l f ter Seller's acceptance 
in Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice. Seller agrees to pay up to mortgage loan discount 
"
 n n l l 0 # X C # e d $
 — •
 {n l d d , t k > n
- »•«•' mrms to pay $ . _ ^ m . . . to be used for Buyer's other loan costs.
 A n ^ - - A s 
SL\ 001541 
i I . four page form Seller'. I n l t l a M ^ U ( ) Date
 U u p i . i.iiliii, | | , ) D j 9 Q Q ( ) 1 Q 9 
3. CONDITION AND CONVi ACE OF TITLE. Seller represents that Seller f£holds title to the property in fee sir. D is purchasing the property under a res 
estate contract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be made as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title to the property, subjec 
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by pi a, current policy of Utte insurance in the amount of purchase price Q an abstract of title brought curren 
with an attorney s opinion (See Section H). 
4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G. Buyer than have the opportunity lo iruroect the tWe to the subject property prior to dosing. Buyer shall take tit 
subject to any existing restrictive covenants, incfudirig corictomiraum restriction (CC 
5. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows:. 
i restric ions (CC A R's). Buyer U h a s Q has not renewed anycaictomiruumCXAI^pn^tosjpningthia^ 
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C. the following items are also warranted:. 
Exceptions to the above and Section C snail be limited to the following:, 
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions ancVor contingencies which must be satisfies 
<r to Heemy ***£&Jas S ? ^ J s77L*C^ iCtS Jl&Lt^ZL<C ^ ^ / ^ ^ ZUS/UULA ; pnor 
19. . at a reasonable location to be designated b> 8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be dosed on or before . 
Seller, subject to Section Q. Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the escrow dosing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase In accordance wrtt 
this Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of D date of possession D date ofeiosing D other
 % 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer « « ^ / ^ /4ff~^j£J*f*&££* extended by written agreement of parties, 
10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the sionjpg of this Agreement the listing agent / f t £ ^ y ^ ^ O t ^ ^ y represents JXj Seller ( ) Buyer, 
and the selling agent
 r
 J
*ifyf^fr*t^i^^''&L4^^ represents f X Seller ( fBuyer Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
written disclosure of the agenc^re|ettion/hip(s) was provided to him/her. ( ) ( ) Buyer's initials \ ) tJ3r ) Seder's Initials. 
11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
ACCEPTED BY * 
ENT" 
IS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE. THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
?HASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall 
to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 
T 
(Buyer's Signatu (Address) ( fPhone) ( res ) (Phone) (SSWTAX ID) 
(Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
CHECK ONE — _ 
D ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
• REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
D COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until (AM/PM) , 19 to accept the terms 
specified below. 
(Date) (Time) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
Seller's Signature) 
:HECK ONE: 
D ACCEPTANCE 
• REJECTION 
DcoyfVrEA 
Buyer's Signature/ 
(Date) (Time) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
EJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer's Initials) 
hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
Pate) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) Pate) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish BuyerV^Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed). 
>A. D l acknowledge receipt of a final copy oMhe^Qregoing Agreement bearing ail signatures: 
A ^ itofo SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
Date 
B. D | personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on. 
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the • Seller Q Buyer. Sent by 
r-age three of a four page form J OOOiiU mfttt" 
A JTKORPT CF SIGNATORS. If Bu\ Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executln Agreement on its behalf warrants 
or her authority to do so and to bind t>w/tr or Seller. 
_ COMPLETE AGREEMENT««- NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This Instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
z all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no oral agreements which modily or alfect this agree-
nt This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
1 COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in wnting and, if attached hereto, shall Incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement 
expressly modified or excluded therein. 
DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
nstitute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to dose because of the nonsatisfaction of any %xptB9s condition 
ontingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
er Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
.ding a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by en-
able law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broke* holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in-
eader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit niBmd to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the prindpal broker to draw from the 
-est money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
-terpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
acurred by the prindpal broker in bringing such action. 
ABROGATION. Except for.express warranties made In this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate-this Agreement 
RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until dosing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
rate hereof and the date of dosing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
-s) of the purchase pnce of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees m writing to repair or replace damaged property 
to closing or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in wnting to repair 
olace and does actually repair and replace damaged property pnor to closing, this transaction shall proceed MS agreed. 
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
'iood. extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the dosing 
shall be extended SB^Bn (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the dosing date provided herein. Thereafter. 
is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
ared by all parties to the transaction. 
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (!&) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs of providing 
~~urance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
„jmed obligations shall be proratedsas set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
-sing. 
=?EAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex-
d herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract, Seller may transfer by either (a) spedal warranty deed, 
imng Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
? contract therein. 
pTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
event with respect to which notice is required. If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
omattcally terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the 
or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice. 
3ROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office. 
:AYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, ,4days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. 
=ORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL - JULY 1 1987 J
 n»s 

